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I. INTRODUCTION ;
It is commonly understood that the tax law is composed of a complicated and
interrelated set of statutory provisions. This raises the possibility that changes to
one area of the law may necessitate revisions to other areas. While statutory
change sometimes means that other provisions need to. be added or amended,
there is also the possibility that the enactment of a new provision allows for the
repeal of another rule because it is either deadwood or simply no longer sensible
in light of the rule's intended purpose as well as fundamental tax policies.
A simplification study released by the Joint Committee on Taxation in 2001
indicates the prevalence of this deadwood (and the like) phenomenon. This
study recommends the repeal of 105 pro\'isions identified as pure deadwood. 1
The study also proposes the elimination of other provisions that no longer serve
sound policy objectives as a result of tax law changes since their.enactment. 2
Given the tax law's interrelated ~tatutory scheme and frequent changes, the
extent of the deadwood phenomenon should come as no surprise .
.An area that is ripe for such a deadwood analysis is the Foreign Investment in
Real Property Tax Act ("FIRPTA"),3 and in particular section 897. 4 Indeed,
FIRPT A has been ripe for such an analysis since the changesyffected by the Tax
Reform Act of 1986.5 This Article suggests that the repeal of portions of FIRPTA

'See STAFF OF THE JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, 107TH CONG., STUDY OF THE OVERALL STATE.OFTHE
FEDERAL TAX SYSTEM AND RECOMMENDATIONS FOR SIMPLIFICATION, PuRSUANT TO SECTION 8022(3)(8) OF
THE INTERNAL REVENUE CODE OF 1986, VOLUME II: RECOMMENDATIONS OF mE STAFF OF .THE JOINT
COMMITTEE ON TAXATION TO SIMPLIFY THE FEDERAL TAX SYSTEM 579,579-593 (Comm. Print 2001).
2See id. at 436-439 (recommending the repeal of the .secondary withholding tax on dividends from
certain foreign corporations that is contained in section 861(a)(2)(B), given that it has largely been
replaced by the branch profits tax); id. at 440-443 (recommending the repeal section 871(a)(2),
which imposes a tax on capital gains of certain nonresident aliens, given that this provision applies
in very limited cases as a result of changes in the tax law since its enactment).
3Foreign Investment in Real Property Tax Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-499, 94 Stat. 2599 (1980).
4All section references are to the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 as amended (the "Code").
sOther commentators have questioned the continuing need for aspects of FIRPTA in light of
subsequent statutory changes and have briefly examined the issue, the most extensive of which is an
excellent, concise analysis by Professor Cynthia Blum of whether the repeal of the General Utilities
doctrine calls for the elimination of the section 897 tax that applies to dispositions of stock in certain
U.S. realty holding corporations. See Cynthia Blum, How the United States Should Tax Foreign
Shareholders, 7 VA. TAX REv. 583, 668-675 (1988); see also Harvey P. Dale, Effectively Connected
Income, 42 TAX L. REv. 689, 714-715 (1987) (very brief analysis); Alan L. Feld, Is FIRPTA
Tax Lawyer, Vol. 57, No.2
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may be in order and sets forth an analysis of the various considerations in
arriving at this conclusion.
A. FIRPTA 's Legislative Background

FIRPT A was enacted in 1980 in order to remove the perceived competitive
advantage experienced by foreign 'persons under the tax law in purchasing U.S.
real estate. Prior to FIRPTA,. foreign persons had used several techniques to
avoid federal income tax upon the disposition of U.S. real estate, while obtaining net basis taxation during the operation of the real property.6 For example, a
foreign person could operate U.S. realty as a trade or business and then dispose
of the realty iIi' an installment sale so that gain was recognized after the foreign
person was no longer engaged in a U.S. business. 7 This technique allowed the
taxpayer to achieve net basis taxation during the operations phase,S which often
meant no federal tax liability during this phase because deductions for depreciation, taxes and interest could offset gross income from operations. 9 If the foreign
person did not maintain aU.S. business when the gain from the disposition was
recognized on the installment method, the realty gain would not be taxable
under the effectively connected regime,1O nor would it be taxable under the fixed
or determinable, annual or periodic ("FDAP") regime as that regime exempts
most types of gain. II In a variation on this technique, the foreign person disposed
of the U.S. real estate by exchanging it for foreign real property in a qualifying
nonrecognition' transaction under the like-kind rule,t2 and subsequently disposed
a"f the foreign realty in a sale that w~uld be beyond U.S. tax jurisdiction. 13 The
like-kind exchange strategy would permit an ultimate disposition of the foreign
realty that was free of U.S. tax even if the taxpayer were actually engaged in a
U.S. business for the year of the sale l4 (or had made a Code election to be so
treated)Y Another technique employed to obtain little or no U.S. taxation on the

. (Partially) Obsolete?, 35 TAX NOTES 607, 607-608 (very brief analysis) (1987); Fred Feingold and
Peter A. Glicklich, An Analysis of the Temporary Regulations Under F1RPTA: Part I, 69 J. TAX'N
262,262-64 (1988) (brief analysis); Letter from New York Bar Ass'n Tax Section to House Ways and
Means Comm., 9 TAX MGMT. WEEKLY REp. 670 (1990) (one paragraph statement); Statement of Nat 'I
Foreign Trade Council to House Ways'and Means Comm., 91 TAX NOTES TODAY 39-70 (1991) (one
paragraph statement).
.
·See H.R. REP. No. 96-1167, at 509-511(1980); S. REP. No. 96-532, at 11-12 (1979).
7SeeH.R. REP. No: 96-1167, supra note 6 at 509-510; S. REP. No. 96-532, supra note 6 at II.
'See I.R.C. §§ 871(b), 882.
'See H. REP. No. 96-1167; supra note 6 at 509; S. REp. No. 96-532, supra note 6 at II.
!OSee I.R.C. §§ 871(b), 882; H. REP. No. 96-1167, supra note 6 at 510; S. REP. No. 96-532, supra
note 6 at II.
IISee I.R.C. §§ 871(a), 881; Reg. § 1.144I-I(b); H. REp. No. 96-1167, supra note 6 at 509; S. REp.
No. 96-532, supra note 6 at 10.
12See 1.R.c. § 1031.
l3See H. REP. No. 96-1167, supra note 6 at 510; S. REp. No. 96-532, supra note 6 at II.
14See H. REP. No. 96-1167, supra note 6 at 510; S. REP. No. 96-532, supra note 6 at II.
ISSections 871(d) and 882(d) provide nonresident aliens and .foreign corporations, respectively~
with an election to treat income from U.S. real property as effectively connected to a U.S. trade or
business. Once made, an election is in effect for all subsequent years unless revoked with the consent
of the Service.I.R.C. §§ 871(d), 882(d).
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operation and disposition of U.S. real property was to take advantage of certain
treaties that allowed taxpayers to make an annual election to treat U.S. real
estate activities as a U.S. trade or business. 16
Foreign persons were also able to achieve this desired tax avoidance treatment
by using corporations to conduct their U.S. real estate activities. Under this
technique, a foreign person would conduct U.S. realty activities as a business
through either a U.S. or foreign corporation, and thus obtain U.S. net basis
taxation on these operations. I? The foreign person could then dispose of the U.S.
real property by first having the corporation sell the U.S. real property after
adopting a plan of liquidation, and then having the corporation distribute the
proceeds of the sale to the shareholder in exchange for her stock. IS Under the
former General Utilities doctrine, the liquidating corporation would not have
recognized any gain on the sale,19 and any gain to the foreign shareholder on the
liquidation would generally be free of U.S. tax under the effectively connected
and FDAP regimes. 20 Alternatively, the foreign investor could have sold stock in
the corporation to the purchaser, with any gain on the sale generally not being
subject to U.S. taxY The purchaser of the stock, even if a U.S. person, could
then liquidate the corporation free of U.S. tax, because the former General
Utilities doctrine would result in nonrecognition treatment at the corporate level,22
and there would be no realized gain at the shareholder level given that the
shareholder's basis should equal the appreciated value of the real property.23
In contrast to the ability of foreign persons to avoid U.S. taxation on the
disposition of U.S. real estate, U.S. persons enjoyed no such treatment. Consequently, the existing rules as applied to the taxation of U.S. realty arguably
violated notions of horizontal equity by subjecting U.S. taxpayers to more onerous U.S. tax treatment on U.S. real estate activities than foreign taxpayers?' This
in turn arguably resulted in foreign persons having a competitive advantage over
their U.S. counterparts in acquiring U.S. real estate. 25
I"See H. REP. No. 96-1167, supra note 6 at 511; S. REP. No. 96-532, supra note 6 at 12.
"See H. REP. No. 96-1167, supra note 6 at 510; S. REp. No. 96-532, supra note 6 at II.
"See H. REP. No. 96-1167, supra note 6 at 510; S. REp. No. 96-532, supra note 6 at 12.
19See I.R.C. § 337 (prior to the Tax Reform Act of 1986); H. REp. No. 96-1167, supra note 6 at
510; S. REp. No. 96-532, supra note 6 at 12.
'OSee I.R.C. §§ 871(a), 871(b), 881, 882; H. REP. No. 96-1167, supra note 6 at 510; S. REP. No.
96-532, supra note 6 at 12. In rare circumstances, the shareholder's gain may have been subject to
tax under section 871 (a)(2).
"See 1.R.c. §§ 871(a), 871(b), 881, 882; H. REP. No. 96-1167, supra note 6, at 510; S. REp. No.
96-532, supra note 6, at 12.
"See I.R.C. § 336 (prior to the Tax Reform Act of 1986).
23See H. REp. No. 96-1167, supra note 6 at 510-511; S. REP. No. 96-532, supra note 6 at 12.
24See STAFF OF THE JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, 98TH CONG., DESCRIPTION OF S. 1915 RELATING TO THE
TAX TREATMENT OF FOREIGN INVESTMENT IN U.S. REAL PROPERTY (Joint Comm. Print 1984); H. REP.
No. 96-1167, supra note 6 at 511; S. REP. No. 96-532, supra note 6 at 12-13.
"See STAFF OF THE JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, supra note 24 (quoting a 1979 General Accounting
Office study as follows: "elimination of the tax advantage foreign investors have would remove a
factor that may be preventing potential U.S. purchasers from competing effectively with potential
foreign purchasers"); cf H. REp. No. 96-1167, supra note 6 at 511 (stating the U.S. tax law should
not continue to provide an inducement for foreign investment in U.S real property); S. REP. No. 96532, supra note 6 at 13.
Tax Lawyer, Vol. 57, No.2
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FIRPTA was enacted to ensure that dispositions of U.S. real property by
foreign persons would not escape federal· income tax, which resulted in the
removal of the U.S. tax advantage experienced by foreign taxpayers.26 Specifically, section 897, FIRPTA's principal provision,27 subjects foreign persons to
U.S. taxation on dispositions of U.S. real property as if the gains were effectively connected with a U.S. business, whether or not the taxpayer was actually
engaged in such a business when the gain was recognized. 28 Thus, the FIRPTA
rule for taxing dispositions of directly held U.S. realty prevents foreign persons
from avoiding federal income taxation on the disposition of U.S. real property
by employing the installment sale technique. 29 Section 897 also contains special
nonrecognition rules that prevent attempts to circumvent FIRPT A by engaging
in nonrecognition transactions (such as like-kind exchanges) in which property
subject to FIRPT A is exchanged for property whose disposition would be free of
U.S. tax. 30 FIRPTA also deals with the ability to use tax treaties to avoid federal
tax on dispositions of U.S. real property by overriding any conflicting treaty
obligations that remain in effect four years after FIRPTA's enactment.Ji
Section 897 tackles the corporate avoidance strategy in two different ways
depending on whether a U.S. or foreign corporation is employed. For situations
involving U.S. corporations, the provision generally taxes foreign persons on
dispositions of stock in U.S. corporations whose assets significantly consist of
U.S. real property.32 Consequently, the statute can reach gain realized by a
foreign person on the disposition of stock pursuant to the liquidation of a U.S.
realty holding corporation, as well as on the sale of the stock to another person.
Where a foreign corporation is employed to hold U.S. real property, the statute
brings on a mini-repeal of the General Utilities doctrine by generally causing a
foreign corporation to recognize gain on the distribution of the realty or sale in
connection with a liquidation. 33 As a result, a disposition of U.S. real property
via the sale followed by liquidating distribution route is taxable under section
897. And while the sale of stock in a foreign corporation holding U.S. realty is
not taxable under FIRPT A, the foreign seller can be expected to bear an indirect
tax due to the receipt of a reduced sales price reflecting the corporation's future
tax liability.34

20See H. REP. No. 96-1167, supra note 6 at 511-12; S. REP. No. 96-532, supra note 6 at 12-13.
27FIRPTA also includes section 1445, which generally requires a purchaser of an interest in U.S.
real property from a foreign person to withhold ten percent of the amount realized by the foreign
person on the disposition. See 1.R.c. § 1445(a). In addition, FIRPTA provides the Treasury with
authority to impose certain information reporting requirements, but at present there are no regula- .
tions imposing these requirements. See I.R.C. § 6039C.
"See I.R.C. § 897(a).
2·See supra notes 7-11 and accompanying text.
30See I.R.C. § 897(e).
3lForeign Investment in Real Property Tax Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-499, § 1125(c)(1), 94 Stat.
2599, 2690 (not codified).
32See 1.R.c. § 897(c)(1 )(A).
"See I.R.C. §§ 897(d); 897(d)(2)(prior to the Tax Reform Act of 1986).
34See Charles D. Rubin and Robert F. Hudson, Federal Taxation of Foreign Investment in U.S.
Real Estate, 912 TAX MGMT. PORTFOLIO (BNA) at A-42 (2003).
Tax Lawyer. Vol. 57, No.2
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B. Subsequent Tax Law Changes

Since the enactment of FIRPTA, there have been several changes in the tax
law that would have eliminated the ability to avoid U.S. taxon the disposition of
U.S. real property through the use of the pre-FIRPTA techniques. Section
864(c)(6), added in 1986,35 provides that the effectively connected status of
deferred gain or income36 is to be determined as if the gain or income were taken
into account in the year in which the underlying sale or other transaction occurred, and without regard to whether the taxpayer is engaged in a U.S. l:iusiness
for the year in which the gain or income is taken into account. Consequently,
even without FIRPT A, taxpayers would not be able to avoid U.S: tax on dispositions of U.S. real property used in business by engaging in installment sales of
U.S. realty. Furthermore, the repeal of the GeneraL Utilities doctrine ("GU Repeal"), which also occurred in 1986,37 would have frustrated the pre-FIRPTA
avoidance strategy of selling U.S. realty after adopting a plan of liquidation,
followed by a liquidating distribution of the proceeds' to the foreign shareholder.
Following GU Repeal, a liquidating corporation is required to recognize gain on
a sale or distribution (as if the distributed property had been sold for its fair
market value),38 thus defeating this technique for avoiding federal tax on the
disposition of U.S. real property. Finally, the like-kind exchange rule was amended
in 1989 39 to provide that U.S. and foreign real property are not like-kind property.40 As a result, regardless of FIRPTA, a foreign person cannot avoid U.S. tax
on a disposition of U.S. business real estate, by swapping the U.S. realty for
foreign realty and then selling the foreign real estate.
C. Method/or AnaLyzing the Continuing Need/or F1RPTA
The effect of these legislative changes on the efficacy of the pre-FIRPTA
avoidan'ce techniques raises the issue of whether the existence of FIRPT A continues to make sense as a policy matter. To this end, this Article examines two
key features of FIRPT A: (i) the rules applying to' dispositions of directly held
U.S. real estate, (ii)' and the rules applying to dispositions of sto~k in u.s-.
corporations whose assets significantly consist of U.S. real estate. 41 For each of

"See Tax Reform Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-514 (1986) (codifying section 1242(a)).
36'fhis provision also can apply to situations involving accelerated income .
. 37See Tax Reform Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-514 (1986) (codifying section 631(a)).
38See I.R.C. § 336(a).
39See Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1989, Pub. L. No. 101-239 (1989) (codifying section
7601(a)).
4°I.R.C. § 1031 (h)(1).
4'Section 897(g) contains another significant feature of FIRPTA that taxes a foreign person on the
disposition of a partnership interest to the extent attributable to U.S, real property interests held by
the partnership. With the ability of a purchaser of the partnership interest to step up the inside basis
of the U.S. real property by electing section 754, this rule is necessary in order to ensure that gain on
the U.S. realty does not escape U.S. tax. See Feingold and Glicklich, supra note 5 at 264. An
analysis of this feature is beyond the scope of. this Article because the need for this provision is
unaffected by subsequent changes in the tax law. Nevertheless, one may question on policy grounds
whether the approach taken in section 897(g) (and the similar approach taken in Revenue Ruling
Tax Lawyer, Vol. 57, No.2
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these features, this Article examines whether Congress's original purposes in
enacting FIRPTA continue to justify the need for the particular feature. In doing
so, this Article assumes that the original purposes are valid: the objective is to
eliminate deadwood and the like, not to question CongreSs's original purposes
for adopting the provisions. 42 Consequently, if it is determined that the original
purposes continue to justify the feature, this Article recommends retention of the
rule.
On the other hand, if it is determined that the feature is no longer necessary in
light of its original purposes, then it still needs to be decided whether other
policy objectives support the rule. There may be sound policy reasons for retaining the feature even though Congress's original reasons for the rule have been
mooted because of subsequent changes in. the tax law. In this regard, this Article
considers the following funpamental policy concerns in the taxation of crossborder business and, investment activities: equity, efficiency, administrability,
I:!"eaty override, and harmonizing different countries' tax laws. For this purpose,
equity refers to the type of horizontal equity concerns that underlie FIRPT A,
that is, similarly taxing U.S. and foreign persons with respect to income that
bears a sufficient economic connection to the United States;43 and efficiency
refers to concerns .of competitive neutrality, also underlying FIRPTA, that aim
to remove competitive advantages created by the tax law for foreign persons
verses their U.S. co).mterparts. 44 This Article also addresses these recognized

1991-32, 1991-1 CB, 107, with regard to partnership assets used in a U,S, trade or business) is the
appropriate solution, Cf Kimberly S. Blanchard, Extrastatutory Attribution of Partnership Activities
(0 Partners, 97 TAX NOTES TODAY 174-24(Sept. 9, 1997) (noting that as an alternative to the
Revenue Ruling 1991-32 approach, Congress instead could deny a stepped-up basis to a purchaser of
a partnership interest from a foreign person),
"In this regard, there is some debate whether equity and efficiency concerns justify the adoption
of FIRPTA, See STAFF OF TIlE JOINT COMM, ON TAXATION, supra note 24 (analyzing the equity
justification for' FIRPTA irid disc.ussing other concerns that should be considered in evaluating
FIRPTA on policy grounds); Richard L Kaplan, Creeping Xenophobia and the Taxation of ForeignOwned Real Estate, 71 GEO. LJ. 1091.(1983) (criticizing the enactment of FIRPTA on policy
grounds), Indeed, in 1986 the Senate passed a measure that would have repealed FIRPTA, but the
bill was not adopted into law. See H.R. 99-3838, at part 2 § 952 (1986). The Senate Finance
Committee advocated repeal because it believed that "FIRPTA is an undesirable impediment to
foreign investment in U.S, real estate," and that the reduced demand lowers the price of U.S. real
property "to the disadvantage of prospective U.S, sellers." S. REP. No. 99-313, at 430 (1986).
43See American Law Institute, Federal Income Tax Project: International Aspects of United States
Income Taxation 9-1\ (1987) (pointing out that in formulating rules for sourced-based taxation,
fairness notions seem to require that foreign persons be treated the same as U.S, persons to the
greatest extent possible); Blum, supra note 5 at 587 (noting the goal of equity in the U.S. taxation of
foreign persons and U.S, persons); cf Stephen K Shay, j, Clifton Fleming, and Robert j, Peroni,
What's Source Got to Do With It?, 56 TAX L REV. 81, 110 (2002) (proposing a criterion for
structuring source-based taxation of nonresidents that provides that the level of taxation be comparable to that imposed on residents earning the same income; basing such on the need for perceived
parity in tax treatment of residents and nonresidents).
"See Statement of Joseph H. Guttentag, International Tax Counsel, Before the Senate Foreign
Relations Committee, 1997 TAX NOTES TODAY 196-25 (Oct. 7, 1997) (in discussing a change in the
U.S. treaty policy with regard to REIT.dividends, pointing out that the Treasury should preserve a
reasonable neutrality with respect to the taxation of foreign and U.S, persons, so that a potential U,S.
investor in U,S real estate should not be outbid by a foreign person because of tax benefits provided
Tax Lawyer, Vol. 57, No.2
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policy objectives in evaluating the need for a particular feature where there is
uncertainty as to whether Congress's original purposes continue to justify the
rule-that is, in situati~ns where some but not all of Congress's objectives are
served without the partic:;ular feature as a result of subsequent legislative changes.
As explained below, this analysis leads to the following conclusions. While it
is somewhat unclear as to whether Congress's original reasons continue to justify the rule for directly held U.S. real estate, fundamental policy considerations
call for the retention of this rule. On the other hapd, serious consideration should
be given to eliminating the rules that apply to dispositions of stock in certain
U.S. real property holding corporations: an original purpose analysis of these
.rules is inconclusive, and a revised policy analysis suggests that the equity and
efficiency benefits of ,the rules may not warrant the significant administrative
costs involved.
II. RULES FOR DISPOSITIONS OF DIRECTLY HELD
U.S. REAL PROPERTY
Section 897(a) provides that a foreign person's gain or loss from the disposition of a U.S. real property interest ("USRPI") is taken into account as if it were
effectively connected with a U.S. trade or business. The term USRPI includes
directly held U.S. real property as well as certain U.S. realty interests held
indirectly through U.S. corporations. 45 The former category of USRPIs consist
of interests in real property, that is, land and improvements, that are located in
the United States or in the Virgin Islands, along with some items of associated
personal property.46 Interests in real property for this purpose include fee simple
interests, leaseholds, options, as well as interests in realty other than solely as a
creditor, such as a right to share in the appreciation in the value of realty.47 In
light of the subsequent statutory changes discussed above, this Part examines
whether the direct USRPI rule continues to be justified on policy grounds.

to the foreign person). In structuring source-based taxation of foreign persons by the United States,
commentators have also expressed a concern over the tax law deterring foreign persons from investing in the United States, and accordingly have proposed a criterion providing that the tax not
discriminate against foreign persons. See Shay, Fleming, and Peroni, supra note 43 at 110-112.
Competitive neutrality is akin to capital import neutrality, and indeed the terms are sometimes used
inter-changeably. See id. at 108; cf CHARLES H. GUSTAFSON, ROBERT 1. PERONI & RICHARD CRAWFORD
PuGH, TAXATION OF iNTERNATIONAL TRANSACTIONS 196 (2d ed. 2001) (noting that concern with respect
to capital import neutrality (among other concerns) has resulted in laws intended to increase the
amount of U.S. tax imposed on foreign persons). However, capital import neutrality usually refers to
the policy of not having U.S. tax law interfere with the ability of U.S. multinationals to compete with
foreign taxpayers in foreign markets, See Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, Globalization, Tax Competition,
and the Fiscal Crisis of the Welfare State, 113 HARV. L. REV. 1573, 1610 (2000) (noting the
argument that capital import neutrality is necessary to preserve the relative competitiveness of U.S
multinationals; questioning the overall merit of this argument).
45See I.R.C. § 897(c)(I).
46I.R.C. § 897(c); Reg,'§ 1.897-I(b)(I).
47I.R.C. § 897(c)(6)(A); Reg. § 1.897-\ (d)(2).
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A. Original Purpose Analysis

As mentioned above, changes in the tax law after the enactment of FIRPT A
call into question the continuing need for the direct USRPI rule. With the addition of section 864(c)(6), even without the direct USRPI rule it would no longer
be possible to use the installment sale ~trategy .to obtain both U.S. net basis
taxation during the operation phase and no U.S. taxation on the disposition of
the U.S. realty. Likewise, the technique calling for a, like-kind exchange followed by a sale of foreign replacement realty is noi vi~ble under current law
given the fact that section 1031(h) .now provi\ie& that U.S. and foreign real
property are not of like kind. The addition of section 864(c)(7) would also
prevent the avoidance of U.S. tax through attempts to convert U:S. realty from a
business use to an investment use prior to disposition: 48 this provision would
treat such property as if it were being used in a U.S: busirtess at the time of its
disposition wher~ it is ~old within 10 years after the property ceased being used
in a U.S. trade or business. Mo~eover, for the most part, .the treaty provisions
that had allowed taxpayers an annual election to be taxed as a U.S. business no
longer exist. 49 Thus, with a few exceptions, regardless of FIRPT A, taxpayers
..

.

4·Although not mentioned in the committee reports accompanying the FIRPTA legislation, this
wouid appear to be viable pre-FIRPTA strategy for obtaining net basis·.taxation and avoiding U.S.
tax on the oisposition of the U.S. realty.
490nly the U.S. income tax treaties with Greece and Trinidad and Tobago allow for an annual net
election. See Income Tax Convention" Feb. 20,1950, U.s.-Greece; art. 8,5 U.S.T. 12; Income Tax
Convent.ion, Jan. 9, 1970, U.S.-Trin. and Tobago, art. 15, 22 U.S.T. 164. All of the other U.S.
treaties either do not provide for the net election or state that once the electi~n is made, it continues
to apply unless the United States gives its consent to the revoke the •election .. See Income Tax
Convention, May 14, 1953, U.S.-Aust!., art. 6,.4 U.S.T. 2264; Income Tax Convention, May 31,
1996, U.S.-Aus., art. 6, T.f.AS. No. 10570;Income Tax Convention, De~. 31,1984, U.S.-Barb., art.
6,22 U.S.T. 164; Income Tax Convention, July 9, 1970, U.S.-Belg:, art. 6,23 U.S.T:2687; Income
Tax Convention, July II, 1986, U.S.-Berm., TAX TREATIES (CCH)'II 1403,02 (no article dealing with
real property); Income Tax Convention; Sept. 26, 1980, U.S.-Can., art. 6, T.I.A.S. No: 11087;
Income Tax Convention, Apr. 30, 1984, U.S.-PRC., art. 6, T.I.A.S. No. 12065; Income Tax Convention, Mar. 19, 1984, U.S.-Cyprus, art. 15, 35 U.S.T. 4737; Income Tax Convention, Sept. 16,
1993, U.S.-Czech Rep., art. 6, TAX TREATIES (CCH) 'II 2403.03; Income Tax Convention, Aug. 19,
1999, U.S.-Den., art. 6, TAX TREATIES (CCH) 'II 2500.02; Income Tax Convention, Jan. 25, 1998,
U.S.-Est., art. 6; Income Tax Convention, Aug. 24,1980, U.S.-Egypt, art. 7, 33 U.S.T. 1809; Income
Tax Convention, Sept. 21,1989, U.S:-Fin., art. 6, T.I.AS.No. i2101; Income Tax Convention, Aug.
31, 1994, U.S.-Fr., art. 6, TAX TREATIES (CCH) 'II 3001.04; Income-Tax. Convention; Aug. 29, 1989,
U.S.-F.R.G., art. 6; Income Tax Convention, Feb. 12, 1979, U.S.-Hung., art. 6, 30 U.S.T. 6357;
Income Tax Convention, May 7, 1975, U.S.-Ice., art. 15,26 U.S.T. 2004; Income Tax Convention,
Sept. 12, 1989, U.SAndia, art. 6, TAX TREATIES (CCH) 'II'4203.05; Income Tax Convention, July II,
1988; U.S.-Indon., art. 6, T.I.A.S. No. 11593; Income Tax Convention; july 28, 1997, U.S.-Jr., art. 6,
TAX TREATIES (CCH) 'II 4401.02; Income Tax Convention, Nov. 20, i975, U.S.-Isr., art. 7, TAX
TREATIES (CCH) 'II 4603.05; Income Tax Convention, Apr. 17, 1984, U.S.-Ita1i, art. 6, T.I.A.S. No.
11064;Income Tax Convention, May 21, 1980, U.S.-Jam., art .. 6, 33 U.S.T. 2865; Income Tax
Convention, Mar. 8, 1971, U.S.-Japan, art. 15,)3 U.S.T. c;J67; Income Tax Convention, Oct. 24,
1993, U.S.-Kaz., art. 9, TAX TREATIES (CCH) 'II 5303.02; Income Tax Convention, June 4, 1976, U.S.Korea, art. 15, 30 U.S.T. 5253; Income Tax Convention, Jan.' 15; 1998, U.S.-Lat., art. 6, TAX
TREATIES (CCH) 'II 5501.02; Income Tax Convention, Jan. 15, 1998, U.S.-Lith., art. 6, TAX TREATIES
(CCH) 'II 5551.02; Income Tax Convention, Apr. 3, 1996, U.S.-Lux., ail. 6, TAX TREATIES (CCH) 'II
5701.05; Income Tax Convention, Sept. 18, 1992, U.S.-Mex., art. '6, T.I.A.S. No. 12404; Income
Tax Convention, Aug. I, 1977, U.S.-Morocco, art. 6, 33 U.S.T. 2545; Income. Tax Convention, Oct.
13,1993, U.S.-Neth., art. 6, TAX TREATIES (CCH) 'II 6103.04; Income Tax Convention, July 23, 1982,
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would be unable to use treaty-based elections to obtain the net basis taxation/no
tax on disposition result where the U.S. realty activities do not in fact amount to
a U.S. trade or business. 5o
On the other hand, the direct USRPI rule is not completely superfluous as a
result of the post-FIRPTA changes. In the absence of the direct USRPI rule,
foreign persons would be able to avoid U.S. tax on the disposition of rental real
estate-at the cost of gross basis taxation during the operations phase-for those
situations where realty activities do not amount to a U.S. business, for example,
the rental of U.S. realty subject to a net lease where an election is not made
under the Code to treat the activity as a U.S. businessY The disposition of raw
land also would escape U.S. taxation without the direct USRPI rule, as would
sales of residences that are outside of the gain exclusion allowed under section
121. 52 In addition, the disposition of other direct USRPI that do not constitute
property used in a U.S. business, such as options to acquire real property and
certain noncreditor interests (for purposes of FIRPT A), would not be subject to
U.S. tax without the rule.
Consequently, in determining whether the direct USRPI rule continues to be
justified in light of Congress's original purposes for adopting the rule, it is
necessary to identify the precise purpose or purposes for the provision. FIRPTA's

U.S.-N.Z., art. 6, 35 U.S.T. 1949; Income Tax Convention, Dec. 3, 1971, U.S.-Nor., art. II, 23
U.S.T. 2832; Income Tax Convention, July I, 1957, U.S.-Pak., 10 U.S.T. 984 (no article dealing
with real property); Income Tax Convention, Oct. I, 1976, U.S.-Phil., art. 7, 34 U.S.T. 1277; Income
Tax Convention, Oct. 8, 1974, U.S.-Pol., art. 7, 28 U.S.T. 891; Income Tax Convention, Sept. 6,
1994, U.S.-Port., art. 6, TAX TREATIES (CCH) 'l! 7803.04; Income Tax Convention, Dec. 4, 1973,
U.S.-Rom., art. 6, 27 U.S.T. 165; Income Tax Convention, June 17, 1992, U.S.-Russ. Fed'n, art. 9,
TAX TREATIES (CCH) 'l! 8003.03; Income Tax Convention, Oct. 8, 1993, U.S.-Slovk. Rep., art. 6, TAX
TREATIES (CCH) 'l! 8103.06; Income Tax Convention, June 21, 1999, U.S.-Slovn., art. 6, TAX TREATIES (CCH) 'l! 8151.06; Income Tax Convention, Feb. 17, 1997, U.S.-S. Afr., art. 6, TAX TREATIES
(CCH) 'l! 8201.06; Income Tax Convention, Feb. 22, 1990, u.S.-Spain, art. 6, 1591 U.N.T.S. 41;
Income Tax Convention, Sept. I, 1994, U.S.-Swed., art. 6, TAX TREATIES (CCH) 'l! 8801.06; Income
Tax Convention, Oct. 2, 1996, U.S.-Switz., art. 6, TAX TREATIES (CCH) 'l! 9101.06; Income Tax
Convention, Nov. 26, 1996, U.S.-Thail., art. 6, TAX TREATIES (CCH) 'l! 9403.06; Income Tax Convention, June 17, 1985, U.S.-Tunis., art.6, TAX TREATIES (CCH) 'l! 10,003.13; Income Tax Convention,
March 28, 1996, U.S.-Turk., art. 6, TAX TREATIES (CCH) 'l! 10,103.06; Income Tax Convention, Mar.
4, 1994, U.S.-Ukr., art. 6, TAX TREATIES (CCH) 'l! 10,303.13; Income Tax Convention, July 24, 2001,
U.S.-U.K., art. 6, TAX TREATIES (CCH) 'l! 10,900.06; Income Tax Convention, June 20, 1973, U.S.U.S.S.R. (no article dealing with real property), TAX TREATIES (CCH) 'l! 10,603; Income Tax Convention, Jan. 25,1999, U.S.-Venez., art. 6, TAX TREATIES (CCH) 'l! 11,103.06.
50With regard to the treaties with Greece and Trinidad and Tobago, the United States should not
have any difficulty in renegotiating these treaties so as to eliminate the annual net election provisions
(should it desire to do so), given that these provisions are clearly out of step with current U.S. treaty
policy.
"See Rev. Rul. 73-522, 1973-2 C.B. 226 (rental property subject to a long-term net lease held not
to constitute a U.S. trade or business); supra note 15 for the net basis election contained in sections
871 (d) and 882(d).
52Section 121 allows a taxpayer to exclude $250,000 (or $500,000, if married filing jointly) of
gain from the disposition of a principal residence, provided that the taxpayer used the property as his
principal residence for two of the previous five years (with the two-year holding period waived in a
few situations). However, it is not clear whether section 121 would exclude gain that would otherwise be taxable under section 897. See Rubin and Hudson, supra note 34 at A-49 to A-50 (discussing the arguments both for and against applying section 121 in connection with section 897).
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legislative history suggests that the point of the direct USRPI rule is to prevent
taxpayers from using the pre-FIRPTA techniques to obtain net basis U.S. taxation during the operations phase while avoiding U.S. tax on the disposition of
the realty. This treatment often resulted in no U.S. tax liability with respect to a
foreign person's U.S. real estate activities despite the presence of sizable economic income. In this regard, the House and Senate reports accompanying
FIRPTA state that "the United States should not continue to provide an inducement through the tax laws for foreign investment in U.S. real property which
affords the foreign investor a number of mechanisms to minimize or eliminate
his tax on income from the property while at the same time effectively exempting himself from U.S. tax on the gain realized on the disposition of the property."53 Therefore, it appears that the stated Congressional purpose for enacting
the direct FIRPT A rule was limited to preventing the tax results that emanated
from the use of the pre-FIRPTA avoidance techniques, nearly all of which are
no longer possible54 given the subsequent changes in the tax law. 55
It is important to point out, however, that despite the focus of the committee
reports, Congress has imposed U.S. tax on all directly held U.S. real property
interests, not just those interests with respect to which the taxpayer received net
basis U.S. taxation. In fact, the statute56 specifically includes options to acquire
real property as interests subject to FIRPT A, even though an option holder will
not receive net basis taxation while holding the interest. Moreover, the committee reports state that "it is essential to establish equity of tax treatment in U.S.
real property between foreign and domestic investors."57 U.S. taxpayers are subject to U.S. tax on dispositions of U.S. real property regardless of the property
being used in a U.S. business. Consequently, Congress's 'reference to tax equity
may indicate that it was concerned not only with the avoidance strategies employed by foreign persons, but also with the ability of such persons to escape
U.S. taxation on the disposition of U.S. realty that had never been used in a U.S.
business. Nevertheless, it is arguable that even without the direct USRPI rule, a
degree of tax equity does exist between U.S. and foreign investors who operate
U.S. rental real estate in a nonbusiness capacity. That is, a foreign person's
ability to escape U.S. taxation on the disposition of the realty may be substantially offset by the harshness of gross basis taxation during the operations phase.
However, in the absence of the direct USRPI rule, fqreign persons' dispositions
of raw land, all residences, as well as options and other noncreditor interests in
U.S. realty, would be outside of U.S. tax jurisdiction. Therefore, situations would

S3H. REp. No. 96-1167, supra note 6 at 511; S. REp. No. 96-532, supra note 6 at 12-13.
s4While the annual net election is still available under two existing U.S. tax treaties, it should not
be difficult to eliminate these unusual treaty provisions if Congress decides to repeal the direct
USRPI rule. See supra notes 49-50 and accompanying text.
sSUnder this view of Congress's purpose, the taxation of gain on the disposition of directly held
U.S. realty is not a goal in itself, but instead the means that Congress chose to remove the tax
advantages experienced by foreign persons through the use of these techniques.
s6LRC. § 897(c)(6)(A).
S7See H. REP. No. 96-1167, supra note 6 at 511; S. REP. No. 96-532, supra note 6 at 12-13.
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exist where foreign persons could receive economic income from U.S. real
property that would not be subject to U.S. tax, an apparent violation of tax
equity vis-a.-vis a similarly situated U.S. person.
The foregoing examination of the legislative history of the direct FIRPTA
rule indicates that Congress had a dual purpose for adopting' this rule. While it
appears that Congress was mainly concerned with preventing foreign persons
from avoiding all (or nearly all) U.S. tax on business operations involving U.S.
real property, subjecting dispositions of interests in investment (and personal)
realty to U.S. tax was a purpose for the rule as well.
Based on this determination of the purposes underlying the direct USRPI rule,
and despite the subsequent tax law changes, the rule still serves one of the
Congressional purposes for its enactment, albeit probably a secondary one. However, a revised policy analysis of the rule should be undertaken because the
direct USRPI rule now plays a diminished role in the taxation of a foreign
person's U.S. real estate activities. The tax law is often a balance of competing
policy objectives, and it needs to be determined whether the reduced benefits of
the direct USRPI rule continue to justify its costs.
B. Revised Policy Analysis

As discussed above, the tax law changes since the enactment of FIRPTA have
eroded the intended function of the direct USRPI rule to simply that of ensuring
the U.S. taxation of a foreign person's disposition of interests in real property
never used in a U.S. business. 58 This section examines whether the direct USRPI
rule, with its reduced role, is justified in light of the policies relevant to the
taxation of foreign persons: equity,59 efficiency,60 administrability, and international tax conCerns of treaty override and harmonization.

1. Equity and Efficiency
The direct USRPI rule continues to advance the horizontal equity concerns
underlying FIRPTA by treating U.S. and foreign persons similarly on the disposition of U.S. real property interests that are held for investment or personal
purposes. The direct USRPI rule also continues to promote the efficiency concern of competitive neutrality by removing the competitive advantage previously experienced by foreign persons under the U.S. tax laws with respect to
their holdings of investment or personal U.S. realty. As noted above, rough

'"One possible, yet impractical exception to this description of the direct USRPI rule's role under
current law is where a foreign person ceases using U.S. real property in a U.S. business and is
willing to wait more than ten years before disposing of the realty in order to escape U.S. taxation on
the disposition. This would result in a situation where, in the absence of the direct USRPI rule, the
foreign person would avoid U.S. tax on the disposition under section 864(c)(7). It would appear,
however, that this would be an unattractive technique for achieving the net basis taxation/no taxation
on disposition results, given the substantial risk of fluctuations in the value of the realty during the
ten year period.
s'See supra note 43 and accompanying text.
roSee supra note 44 and accompanying text.
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equity would be achieved notwithstanding the direct USRPI rule with regard to
foreign persons that hold rental real estate as an investment. 61 Nevertheless, by
pulling in raw land, options and noncreditor interests (for purposes of FIRPT A)
such as loans with equity kickers, as well as personal residences,62 the direct rule
promotes equity and efficiency. by imposing U.S. tax on the disposition of U.S.
real estate interests that otherwise would likely be outside of the effectively
connected income tax regime. 63
2. Administrability

Tax administration is an important concern in the taxation of foreign (and
U.S.) persons. While there are some tradeoffs, the overall effect of the direct
USRPI rule is to simplify the tax law as it applies to U.S. real estate activities
conducted by foreign persons. First, the direct USRPI rule obviates the need to
determine whether a foreign person's U.S. real estate activities constitute the
conduct of a U.S. trade or business for purposes of subjecting gain (or loss) on
the disposition of the realty to the effectively connected income tax regime.
Regardless of whether the activities amount to a U.S. business, section 897(a)
will treat gain or loss from the dispositions of direct USRPIs as if the items were
effectively connected with a U.S. trade or business. Second, an indirect effect of
the direct USRPI rule is to substantially obviate the need to make such a determination for purposes of applying the effectively connected regime to the operations phase of U.S. realty activities. This results because, with the direct USRPI
rule, most foreign persons will elect to treat income-producing U.S. real estate
activities as a U.S. business for purposes of applying the effectively connected
rules.64 The net election always had a significant upside because it assured net
basis taxation and thus deductions for depreciation, real estate taxes, and other
expenses associated with the operation of income-producing real property. However, prior to FIRPTA there was a downside as well to making the electionspecifically, any recognized gain65 on the disposition of the realty would be

61See supra text accompanying note 57.
62As noted earlier, there is an issue as to whether section 121 could apply to exclude the gain on
the sale of a principal residence notwithstanding the direct USRPI rule. See supra note 52.
63With regard to certain noncreditor interests (for purposes of FIRPTA) in U.S. realty, there may
be an issue as to whether they constitute partnership interests. See generally WILLIAM MCKEE,
WILLIAM NELSON AND ROBERT WHITMIRE, FEDERAL TAXATION OF PARTNERSHIPS AND PARTNERS'll 3.03[3]
(3d ed. 1997 & Supp. 200 I). If so and if the underlying realty is being used in a U.S. business,
regardless of the direct USRPI rule, a foreign holder of such an interest should be subject to U.S. tax
under the effectively connected regime on the income received through the holding or disposition of
the interest. See 1.R.c. §§ 875(1), 864(c); Rev. Rul. 1991-32, 1991-1 C.B. 107.
64See Christopher H. Hanna, Some Modest Simplification Proposals for Inbound Transactions, 56
SMU L. REv 377, 384 (2003) (pointing out that it is almost always advantageous to make the
election).
65As mentioned earlier, a pre-FIRPTA technique used to avoid tax on the disposition of U.S. realty
where an election had been made was to exchange the U.S. realty for foreign realty in a qualifying
like-kind exchange, and then dispose of the foreign realty in a disposition that would be free of U.S.
tax. See supra notes 14-15 and accompanying text.
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subject to U.S. tax whether or not the activities constituted a U.S. business. 66
The direct USRPI rule removed that downside as the election has no bearing on
the taxation of the disposition under FIRPTA.67 Consequently, well-advised taxpayers generally should make the net election. As a result, the effect of the direct
USRPI rule is to significantly elimiQate the need to engage in a fact-based
inquiry as to whether U.S. real estate activities are continuous, regular, and
substantial enough to constitute a U.S. business. While the guidelines gleaned
from cases and rulings regarding this inquiry are reasonably clear at either end
of the spectrum, there appears to be a good deal of uncertainty in the middle
because such determinations are factually based. 68
The direct USRPI rule does, however, add to the intricacy and uncertainty of
the tax law through the rules for determining the types of noncreditor interests
subject to FlRPTA. For example, the regulations apply the FIRPTA provisions
to loans that give the lender any direct or indirect right to share in the profits
generated by U.S. realty.69 The rule crea.tes uncertainty as to (i) whether this
would cover a right to share in profits from a nonrealty business that uses some
real property, and (ii) what constitutes an indirect right to share in such profits.
In addition, a FlRPTA exemption for loans with indexed interest rates contains
an exception for an interest rate that is tied to an index whose principal purpose
is to reflect changes in real property values 7°-a provision that has the potential
for controversy. Nevertheless, the rules for loans with equity kickers appear to
provide some offsetting administrative benefits, in that they may in some cases
eliminate the practical need for determining whether such interests are disguised
partnership interests for purposes of subjecting the foreign holder to the effectively connected income rules. 71 Moreover, these rules presumably reflect a
previous determination that the additional equity and efficiency achieved by
subjecting these interests to U.S. tax warrants -the concomitant complexity, a
determination that this Article assumes to be valid.72
The rules governing the types of associated property subject to FIRPTA also
add to the complexity of the law; nevertheless, for the most part these rules
present administrative tradeoffs. That is, on one hand, the regulations for determining personal property associated with the use of real property contain several
categories of property, each with intricate, fact-specific standards. 73 These
66Another potential downside at one time was the difference in the tax rate that would apply-30%
if the election was not made verses rates as high as 70% for individuals and 48% for corporations
with the election. See Hanna, supra note 64 at 383. With the highest individual and corporate tax
rates now at 35%, there is no longer a tax rate downside in making the election.
67See Hanna, supra note 64 at 384.
6SSee Rubin and Hudson, supra note 34 at A-9 to A-IO; Hanna, supra note 64 at 382; American
Law Institute, supra note 43 at 101; Richard Crawford Pugh, Policy Issues Relating to the U.S.
Taxation of Foreign Persons Engaged in Business in the United States Through Agents: Some
Proposals for Reform, I SAN DIEGO INT'L L.J. I, 16 (2000).
60See Reg. § 1.897-I(d)(2)(i).
70See Reg. § 1.897-1 (d)(2)(ii)(D).
"See supra note-63.
72Cf supra note 42 and accompanying text.
73See Reg. § 1.897-I(b)(4)(i).
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regulations also provide for complex exceptions to FIRPTA's coverage of associated personal property that focus on the timing of the disposition as well as the
identity (related or not) and the intentions of the transferees of the personal
property.74 Despite these exceptions, it appears that in many instances dispositions of associated personal property are 'subject to the effectively connected
regime in any event due to the general rules contained in section 864(c)(2) and
(c)(3), or the look-back rules contained in sections 864(c)(6) and (c)(7), thereby
reducing the need to grapple with these FIRPT A provisions. Further, in some
situations the associated personal property rules may result in administrative
benefits by substituting a specific category approach for a more nebulous factbased standard under the effectively connected income rules. 75
In addition, the presence of the direct USRPI rule simplifies the administration of a withholding mechanism for dispositions of U.S. real property.76 Even if
Congress decided to eliminate the direct USRPI rule, it would still likely require
tax withholding on dispositions of U.S. realty that are otherwise subject to the
effectively connected regime, specificaily, realty that had been used in a U.S.
business. The perceived enforcement difficulties that led Congress to adopt the
FIRPT A withholding rules 77 would likely remain, even with a tax limited to
dispositions of business realty.78 Yet, without the direct USRPI rule, it would be
necessary to require someone79 to make the determination as to whether or not
the realty is, or was, U.S. business property, an inquiry that would complicate
the administration of such a withholding requirement.
3. International Tax Concerns
Other important concerns in the taxation of foreign persons relate to obligations under treaties and limitations that arise out of the desire to harmonize the
income tax laws of different countries.
74See Reg. § 1.897-1 (b)(4)(ii).
"See I.R.C. § 864(c)(2); Reg. § 1.864-4(c)(2), (c)(3).
76As previously mentioned, section 1445 generally requires a transferee of a USRPI from a foreign
person to withhold ten percent of the amount realized on the disposition. See I.R.C. § 1445(a).
"See STAFF OF THE JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, GENERAL EXPLANATION OF THE REVENUE PROVISIONS OF
THE DEFICIT REDUcnON ACT OF 1984, H.R. 4170, 98th Cong., P.L. 98-369, 406 (Jan. 23, 1984)
(stating that a major problem with ARPTA as first enacted (under which the tax was not due until a
return was filed) was that it could be easily evaded by a foreign person removing the proceeds from
U.S. realty dispositions beyond the jurisdiction of the United States).
78In this regard, section 1446 is an example of a withholding mechanism applying to a foreign
person's U.S. business income, specifically, a foreign partner's distributive share of partnership
income that is effectively connected to a U.S. trade or business. This provision was enacted because
of the perceived enforcement difficulties with regard to a foreign partner who may not be present in
the United States. See STAFF OF THE JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, GENERAL EXPLANATION OF THE TAX
REFORM ACT OF 1986, H.R. 3838, 99th Cong., P.L. 99-514,1055 (Comm. Print 1986).
79As indicated by the existing withholding rules under the Code and regulations, a determination
such as this could be made by the withholding agent (compare section 1446 regarding the partnership's
determination of a foreign partner's distributive share of effectively connected income of the partnership), the Service (compare section 1445(c) and Regulation section 1.1445-3 regarding the Service~ s
determination of a taxpayer's maximum tax liability on a disposition of a USRPI), or even the
taxpayer (compare section 1441 and Regulation section I. I 441-4(a) regarding a taxpayer's claim of
effectively connected status for purposes of a withholding exemption).
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Although more than 20 years have elapsed since the enactment of FIRPT A, it
still may be relevant to consider the extent to which the provisions conflict with
the United States' obligations under income tax treaties. Of the 55 current income tax treaties, the United States entered into 12 of them prior to the adoption
of FIRPT A.8o Consequently, it is possible that features of the legislation continue to conflict with the obligations contained in a significant number of treaties; and where FIRPTA conflicts with a treaty, the legislation provides that the
statute will prevail as of January I, 1985.81 Congress presumably determined
that the equity and efficiency benefits of FIRPTA outweigh the negative consequences of overriding existing treaty obligations. 82 However, given the reduced
equity and efficiency benefits stemming from the direct USRPI rule, this issue
should be reconsidered. Nevertheless, all of the existing pre-FIRPT A treaties
permit the United States to tax a foreign person on gain derived from the disposition of a direct interest in U.S. real property.83 And while the direct USRPI rule
appears to be broader than most of these treaties in that it also pulls in certain
noncreditor interests and associated personal property, Congress has presumably
determined that the additional equity and efficiency achieved by taxing these
items justifies overriding treaties to this extent-a determination that this Article
does not disturb.84
The direct USRPI rule also appears to be generally consistent with the tax
laws of most other countries. That is, countries typically cede tax jurisdiction
with respect to their residents (through either foreign tax credit mechanisms or
territorial systems) over gain derived from direct real property holdings located
in another country.85 As a result, the direct USRPI rule should not pose a signifi80See Treaties Ratified and Entered into Force, 2002, 5 I 3-14, TAX TREATIES (CCH).
81Foreign Investment in Real Property Tax Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-499, § I I 25(c)(I), 94 Stat.
2599,2690 (not codified).
82Indeed, the delayed treaty override by FIRPTA indicates that Congress certainly considered the
impact on existing U.S. treaty obligations. Cf DEP'T OF TREASURY, TAXATION OF FOREIGN INV. IN U.S.
REAL ESTATE 53-54 (1979) (Treasury study leading to FIRPTA points out that in contemplating
changes to the tax law treaty obligations must be taken into account; stating that there should be
considerably less international objection to prospective override of treaties). Nevertheless, an issue
exists as to whether Congress struck the appropriate balance in deciding that the original equity and
efficiency benefits of FIRPTA outweigh the concerns with overriding treaty obligations. See Kaplan,
supra note 42 at 1122 (seeing the concerns relating to treaty override as possibly a countervailing
factor to any equity basis for FIRPTA).
83See Income Tax Convention, July 9, 1970, U.S.-Belg., art. 6, 23 U.S.T. 2687; Income Tax
Convention, Feb. 20, 1950, U.S.-Greece, art. 8,5 U.S.T. 12; Income Tax Convention, Feb. 12, 1979,
U.S.-Hung., art. 6, 30 U.S.T. 6357; Income Tax Convention, May 7, 1975, U.S.-Ice., art. 15, 26
U.S.T. 2004; Income Tax Convention, Mar. 8, 1971, U.S.-Japan, art. 15,23 U.S.T. 967; Income Tax
Convention, June 4, 1976, U.S.-Korea, art. 15, 30 U.S.T. 5253; Income Tax Convention, Dec. 3,
1971, U.S.-Nor., art. 11,23 U.S.T. 2832; Income Tax Convention, July I, 1957, U.S.-Pak., to
U.S.T. 984 (Senate reservation to art. (4); Income Tax Convention, Oct. 8, 1974, U.S.-Pol., art. 7, 28
U.S.T. 891; Income Tax Convention, Dec. 4, 1973, U.S.-Rom., art. 6, 27 U.S.T. 165; Income Tax
Convention, Jan. 9, 1970, U.S.-Trin. and Tobago, art. 15,22 U.S.T. 164; Income Tax Convention,
June 20, 1973, U.S.-U.S.S.R., TAX TREATIES (CCH) 'lI 10.603 (no article prohibiting such taxation).
84 Cf supra note 42 and accompanying text.
85See American Law Institute, supra note 43 at 37-38 (1987) (pointing out that it is traditional
throughout the world to source gain derived from real property in the country where the real property
is located).
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cant risk of double taxation,86 a concern that underlies the desire to harmonize
the tax laws of different countries.
4. Evaluation
The revised policy analysis indicates that despite the subsequent changes in
the tax law, the direct USRPI rule should be retained. The rule continues to
advance the Congressional goal of equitably and efficiently taxing foreign and
U.S. persons with respect to U.S. real estate activities, albeit to a lesser extent
with the post-FIRPT A changes. Moreover, the direct USRPI rule serves to simplify the taxation of foreign persons' U.S. realty operations and is generally
consistent with both U.S. treaty obligations and the tax laws of other countries.
In addition, as recommended by the American Law Institute87 and others,88 the
tax law should be further simplified and improved by eliminating the net basis
election for U.S. real estate and instead providing that all income from U.S. real
estate be treated as effectively connected to a U.S. trade or business. Since
taxpayers generally should be making the election, the recommended approach
will avoid the trap for the unwary that currently appears to exist. 89 Moreover,
this approach would eliminate the paperwork attending the election,90 as well as
obviate the difficult, fact-based inquiry regarding trade or business status that
can arise in the rare cases where the election is not made under current law. 91
III. RULES FOR DISPOSITIONS OF STOCK IN U.S. CORPORATIONS
THAT HOLD U.S. REAL PROPERTY
Besides direct USRPIs, FIRPT A taxes a foreign person on the gain from the
disposition of stock (and other noncreditor interests) in certain U.S. corporations
holding U.S. real property. Specifically, the definition of USRPI also includes
any interest (other than an interest solely as a creditor) in any U.S. corporation,
unless the taxpayer establishes that the corporation was not a U.S. real property
holding corporation ("USRPHC") at any time during 'the shorter of the period
that the foreign person held the interest or the five-year period ending on the

86 Although the direct USRPI rule may go a bit further than is typical, by including certain
noncreditor interests and associated personal property, again, it is presumed that Congress has
previously decided that the additional equity and efficiency achieved warrants the greater risk of
double taxation involved. Cf supra note 42 and accompanying text.
81See American Law Institute, supra note 43 at 101-102.
"See Pugh, supra note 68 at 16; cf. Hanna, supra note 64 at 383-384 (recommending that
nonbusiness income from U.S. real property be treated as effectively connected to a U.S. trade or
business unless the foreign person elects otherwise).
89See American Law Institute, supra note 43 at 101; Hanna, supra note 64 at 384.
90See Hanna, supra note 64 at 383-384 (describing what must be included on the statement
attached to the return if the election is made; pointing out that his recommendation will minimally
reduce paperwork by eliminating substantially the need to make the election); American Law Institute, supra note 43 at 102 (pointing out that eliminating the election will avoid the IRS warehousing
of election forms).
9'See American Law Institute, supra note 43 at 101-102 (pointing out that eliminating the election
will obviate the need for well-advised taxpayers to examine what can be murky case law).
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date of the disposition of the interest ("testing period").92 A corporation is a
USRPHC if the fair market value of the corporation's USRPIs equals or exceeds
50% of (i) its USRPIs, (ii) its interests in foreign real property, plus (iii) any
other of its assets that are used or held for use in a trade or business. 93
-Exceptions from the FIRPT A tax are provided for stock in publicly traded
corporations (in general),94 stock in domestically-controlled REITs,95 and for
dispositions of stock in a USRPHC where the corporation at th~ time of the
disposition did not hold any USRPIs and any such interests held during the
testing period were disposed of in fully taxable transactions. 96 In addition, a
disposition of stock in a foreign corporation is not taxable under FIRPT A.97
There is a considerable amount of statutory and regulatory machinery needed
to implement the USRPHC rules. Among these rules are methods for determining the fair market value of property;98 an alternative book value test for USRPHC
status;99 provisions for determining which assets are used or held for use in a
trade or business;loo complex provisions for determining when a corporation
must be tested for USRPHC status;lOl look-through rules for controlling interests
in other corporations and interests in partnerships, estates and trusts;102 and procedures for establishing that a corporation is not a USRPHC. 103 In addition, the
regulations provide backstops to the USRPHC rules through special 'nonrecognition rules that impose a toll charge on certain distributions of USRPIs by a
foreign corporation that follow dispositions of the foreign corporation's stock,
apparently because the effect of such transactions can be similar to a transfer of
stock in a USRPHC. 104 The regulations also employ other special corporate
nonrecognition rules that seem to be aimed at preventing taxpayers from transferring U.S. realty interests in corporate solution without a current tax. 105
As discussed previously, GU Repeal raises the issue of whether the USRPHC
rules remain necessary as a policy matter. This Part analyzes this issue by first
examining the original purposes for the USRPHC rules. After concluding that it
is uncertain as to whether the original purposes continue to justify the USRPHC

92l.R.C. § 897(c)(1)(A)(ii).
9Jl.R.C. § 897(c)(2).
94I.R.C. § 897(c)(3). Excluded from this exception are persons who hold, both actually and constructively, more than five percent of the class of stock during the testing period. I.R.C. § 897(c)(3),
(c)(6)(C).
9sl.R.C. § 897(h)(2). A domestically-controlled REIT exists where during the testing period, less
than 50% by value of the REIT stock is held directly or indirectly by foreign persons.
96I.R.c. § 897(c)(1)(B).
97I.R.C. § 897(c)(1)(A)(ii), (c)(4)(A).
98Reg. § 1.897-1(0).
99Reg. § 1.897-2(b)(2).
'OOReg. § 1.897-1 (f).
'O'Reg. § 1.897-2(c).
102l.R.C. § 897(c)(4), (c)(5); Reg. § 1.897-I(e), -2(e).
'OJReg. § 1.897 -2(g), (h).
'(}<Temp. Reg. § 1.897-5T(c), as modified by Notice 1989-85, 1989-2 C.B. 403.
IOsSee Temp. Reg. § 1.897-6T(a), (b).
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rules, this Part then proceeds by considering fundamental policies relevant to the
taxation of foreign persons.
A. Original Purpose Analysis

Regardless of the USRPHC rules, GU Repeal derails ·the pre-FIRPTA technique involving U.S. corporate ownership of U.S. real property. That is, net
basis U.S. taxation for realty operations and no U.S. taxation on the disposition
of the real property can no longer be achieved. Under this pre-FIRPTA technique, the foreign person could dispose of the U.S. realty by having the corporation sell the realty after adopting a plan of liquidation, followed by a liquidating
distribution of the sale proceeds to the foreign shareholder. However, since the
repeal of old section 337 in 1986, the U.S. corporation would recognize any gain
(or loss) on the sale in connection with the liquidation, thus subjecting gain on
the disposition to U.S. tax. If the foreign investor instead were to sell stock in
the corporation to the purchaser, who then liquidated the corporation in order to
receive the U.S. real property with a stepped-up basis, new section 336(a) (added
in 1986) would cause the corporation to recognize any gain (or loss) on the
liquidating distribution as if the property were sold to the distributee for its fair
market value.
Nevertheless, without the USRPHC rules, a foreign person holding stock in a
USRPHC could, in theory, sell the stock to a purchaser who does not intend to
liquidate the corporation, and avoid an immediate U.S. tax on the gain inherent
in the underlying USRPI. While the purchaser would likely pay a reduced price
for the stock, given the lack of a stepped-up basis in the corporate assets, the
discount should be less than the amount of an immediate corporate tax in light of
time value of money considerations. Consequently, despite GU Repeal, the
USRPHC rules continue to ensure that the disposition of stock in a USRPHC is
subject to an immediate U.S. tax, rather than what amounts to a discounted tax.
At issue then is whether the USRPHC rules with their more limited role
continue to be justified in light of the original purposes for the rules.106 On the
one hand, the legislative history suggests that Congress intended the USRPHC
rules to prevent a tax-free disposition of U.S. real property that provides the
purchaser with a stepped-up basis in the property. In describing the pre-FIRPTA
corporate technique to obtain the benefits of current net basis taxation and exemption from tax on gain, both the House and Senate Reports provide an example involving the liquidation of a corporation holding U.S. realty as a step in
the ultimate tax-free disposition of the realty via a stock sale.107 Thus, it appears
that Congress assumed that a disposition of corporate-held real property by way

I06In this regard, it is clear that the USRPHC rules are not designed as a second level of tax on
gain derived from U.S. corporate real estate. See Blum, supra note 5 at 669-670. Although sometimes a second tax occurs, section 897(c)(l)(B) provides an exception to the FIRPTA tax on dispositions. of USRPHC stock where the corporation has already incurred a tax on all of the USRPIs that it
held during the testing period.
7
10 See H. REp. No. 96-1167, supra note 6 at 510-511; S. REp. No. 96-532, supra note 6 at 12.
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of a stock sale would entail the liquidation of the corporation.108 This, in tum,
suggests that the USRPHC rules were intended to prevent the favorable tax
consequences occurring in these situations. 109
Additional support for this view may be found in the treatment of foreign
corporations and REITS under FIRPT A. Dispositions of stock in foreign corporations are not subject to FIRPT A, but instead foreign corporations are generally
taxable under FIRPTA on distributions of USRPIs to shareholders. I 10 The FIRPT A
treatment of domestically-controlled REITS is similar to that of foreign corporations. III Thus, these provisions provide further indication that in adopting the
corporate FIRPTA rules, Congress intended to prevent tax-free corporate distributions of U.S. real property that gave the shareholder a stepped-up basis in the
distributed property. The rules for foreign corporations and domesticallycontrolled REITS also imply that at least in these situations, Congress was not
concerned with imposing an immediate tax on a disposition of stock in a real
property holding corporation, absent a corporate distribution of U.S. realty.
The fact that Congress chose to combat the corporate avoidance strategy by
taxing the disposition of stock in a USRPHC, rather than taxing the corporate
distribution, does not necessarily contradict this purpose. GU Repeal was still
several years away. And while it may have been possible for Congress to minirepeal the General Utilities doctrine just for distributions of U.S. real property
by U.S. corporations (and sales of U.S. realty by liquidating corporations),112
such a corporate-level tax would have been borne by both the foreign and U.S.
shareholders of the corporation. Similarly, denying the purchaser a stepped-up
basis for the U.S. realty upon liquidation ll3 would have resulted in a lower
purchase price for all of the shareholder~. Thus, such measures may not have
advanced the equity and efficiency goals of FIRPTA by ensuring that foreign
persons bear the burden of the additional tax. 114 In addition, there may have been

108C! Diane Renfroe, Andre Fogarasi, Richard Gordon, and John Venuti, 1989 Tax Bill: Taxing
Foreign Investors on Capital Gains, 44 TAX NOTES 1415, 1419 (Sept. 18, 1989) (the drafters of
FIRPTA assumed that a purchaser of stock in a foreign corporation holding U.S. real estate would
want to liquidate the corporation to obtain a stepped-up basis in the underlying realty).
[()9It is entirely possible that had Congress considered the situation involving a stock disposition
with no liquidation in a post-GU Repeal world, it may have decided that effectively imposing a
discounted tax sufficiently advances FIRPTA's equity and efficiency goals. As discussed earlier, it
appears that Congress mainly was concerned with the ability to avoid all (or nearly all) U.S. taxation
through a combination of net basis taxation during operations and ewmption from tax on the gain
upon disposition. See supra notes 6-23 and accompanying text.
iiOI.R.C. § 897(c)(I)(A)(ii), (d)(I).
lllSee I.R.C. § 897(h)(2), (h)(3).
112C! DEP'T OF TREASURY, supra note 82 at 53 (apparently suggesting the possibility of targeted
GU Repeal, as opposed to taxing sales of corporate stock, in order to combat the pre-FIRPTA realty
holding corporation technique).
ll3C! id. (apparently suggesting the possibility of eliminating the step-up in basis to the purchaser
upon liquidation, as opposed to taxing sales of corporate stock, in order to combat the pre-FIRPTA
realty holding corporation technique).
ii4FIRPTA's mini GU Repeal for foreign corporations may not present a similar problem in that it
would appear unlikely for a U.S. person to hold stock in a foreign real property holding corporation.
See infra notes 178-188 and accompanying text. Also, GU Repeal for distributions of

Tax Lawyer. Vol. 57, No.2

WITHER FIRPTA?

315

administrative reasons why Congress chose not make taxation dependent on the
occurrence of a liquidation in connection with the stock disposition, as such a
requirement would necessitate intent or timing tests that would further complicate the application of the USRPHC rules. Consequently, a tax on the disposition of USRPHC stock may have been Congress's only acceptable and viable
option for imposing tax on a sale of U.S. real property that had been held in U.S.
corporate solution. 115
On the other hand, it cannot be ruled out that Congress also intended to
impose an immediate tax, rather than a discounted tax, on dispositions of stock
in USRPHCs where a liquidation is not contemplated. The USRPHC rules impose tax on a qualifying stock disposition regardless of whether there is a corporate distribution of U.S. real property. Moreover, for situations involving foreign
corporations, Congress originally intended to use a shareholder tax as well,1I6
but retreated presumably because of jurisdictional and enforcement concerns
over taxing foreign persons on dispositions of foreign stock. 1I7 Consequently,
the evolution of the FIRPTA rules for foreign corporations may weaken the
implication that Congress was not concerned with imposing an immediate tax on
a disposition 'of foreign corporate stock absent a corporate distribution of U.S.
real property. It may also be possible to explain the exception from the USRPHC
rules for domestically-controlled REITs as a countervailing inducement for foreign persons to invest in U.S. real estate. lIS The domestically-controlled requirement may tie in to this rationale given that this requirement seems to ensure that
income tax planning for foreign persons would not dominate the REIT's investment and distribution policies. 1I9 Thus, Congress may have recognized that the
law's failure to tax a disposition of USRPHC stock, even in the absence of a
liquidation, also created a loophole that it generally wanted to close. 120

USRPIs by domestically-controlled REITS only applies to the extent of the foreign-owned percentage of the REIT (see LR.C. § 897(h)(3)); consequently, it would appear to be possible for regulations
to allocate General Utilities gain to the foreign shareholders of the REIT (the REIT being a passthrough entity), although there are no regulations providing for this treatment. Cf Arthur A. Feder
and Lee S. Parker, The Foreign Investment in Real Property Tax Act of 1980,34 TAX LAW. 545, 568
(1981) (suggesting the possibility of devising such regulations).
115Thus, taxing dispositions of USRPHC stock may not have been a goal·in itself, but instead the
means chosen by Congress to eliminate the tax advantages of the pre-FIRPTA corporate technique.
116See H. REP. No. 96-1167, supra note 6 at 511-512; S. REP. No. 96-532, supra note 6 at 13-14;
H. REp. No. 1479 (Conf. Rep.), 1980-2 C.B. 583, 584.
117See Rubin and Hudson, supra note 34 at A-42; Renfroe, Fogarasi, Gordon, and Venuti, supra
note 108 at 1419; Feingold and Glicklich, supra note 5 at 262.
118See Feder and Parker, supra note 114 at 567. The legislative history to FIRPTA provides no
reasons for this treatment.
119See Carl Estes, II, Foreign Investment in U.S. Real Estate through REITS, 7 TAX MGT. REAL
EST. J. (BNA) 103 (June 5, 1991).
121Yfhis desire may have prompted Treasury to propose the forerunner of the USRPHC rules, rather
than the measures it first recommended that apparently called for targeted GU Repeal and denial of a
stepped-up basis in the U.S. realty to the purchaser upon corporate liquidation (see supra notes 112113). See Taxation of Foreign Investment in the United States: Hearing Before the Senate Subcomm.
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The preceding analysis suggests two possibilities regarding Congress's purpose for enacting the USRPHC rules. One possibility is that Congress intended
to tax foreign persons on dispositions of U.S. real property held in U.S. corporate solution that provided the purchaser with a stepped-up basis in the U.S.
realty: that is, dispositions that are carried out either by having the corporation
sell the U.S. realty after adopting a plan of liquidation, or by having the foreign
investor sell stock in the corporation followed by a liquidating distribution of the
realty to the purchaser. With this as the purpose, GU repeal should call for the
elimination of the USRPHC rules in the absence of other sound policy objectives. 121 A secondary purpose for the USRPHC rules may have been to tax a
foreign person on a sale of USRPHC stock even where there is no liquidation of
the corporation to ensure that such dispositions are subject to full, rather than
discounted, U.S. tax. Assuming this is the case, the USRPHC rules continue to
serve a Congressional purpose despite GU Repeal. Nevertheless, it is still questionable whether the benefits of serving this secondary purpose warrant the costs
involved because the main purpose for the USRPHC rules would be achieved in
any event. Consequently, under either view of the purposes underlying the
USRPHC rules, scholars and policymakers should examine other recognized
policy concerns to determine whether the rules continue to be justified.
B. Revised Policy Analysis

This section examines whether the continuing benefits of the USRPHC rules,
whether or not intended by Congress, warrant the costs involved. In doing so,
this Article again considers the policies relevant to the taxation of foreign persons: equity, efficiency, administrability, and international tax concerns. In applying the equity and efficiency criteria, this Article assumes the propriety of the
current policy under which foreign persons are generally not subject to two
levels of U.S. tax on their gains attributable to property held in U.S. corporate
solution.122
On Taxation and Debt Mgmt., 96th Congo 144, 153 (1979) [hereinafter Hearing) (statement of
Marshall J. Langer, attorney) (stating that the central concern of the Treasury proposal is to prevent
foreign investors from avoiding U.S. tax by engaging in tax-free sales of stock in U.S. real estate
holding corporations; characterizing that fear as "unrealistic and unfounded" if the tax-free step-up
in basis is eliminated, in light of the fact that there would be a discounted purchase price and very
few buyers for the shares).
I2IC! Feingold and Glicklich, supra note 5 at 264 (stating that with the GU Repeal, there is no
need for section 897 to tax dispositions of U.S. stock, and thus FIRPTA can be greatly simplified);
Statement of National Foreign Trade Council to House Ways and Means Comm., supra note 5
(calling for the repeal of FIRPTA, given that with the GU Repeal, there is no significant potential for
foreign persons to avoid U.S. tax on U.S. real estate by liquidating U.S. realty holding corporations,
and FIRPTA causes significant complexity and potentially inhibits foreign investment).
122See infra notes 137-139 and accompanying text for a further discussion of this point. Commentators have legitimately questioned whether this aspect of source taxation results in the fair and
neutral treatment of foreign investors verses their U.S. counterparts. See Shay, Fleming, and Peroni,
supra note 43 at 145 (calling for a reexamination of the general exemption from source taxation of
gains on the sale of stock in U.S. corporations). It is important to point out that if foreign persons
were generally subject to U.S. tax on gains from the sale of stock in U.S. corporations, this should
render the USRPHC rules superfluous. See Blum, supra note 5 at 675 (calling for the repeal of the
USRPHC rules if U.S. tax is imposed generally on U.S. stock gains of foreign persons).
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1. Equity and Efficiency
a. In GeneraL. Whether or not Congress intended this to be the case, the
USRPHC rules may advance horizontal equity by imposing an immediate tax, as
opposed to whatis effectively a discounted tax, on a foreign person's disposition
of stock in a USRPHC where the corporation is not liquidated. A goal of FIRPTA
is to promote equity of tax treatment with regard to U.S. real estate between U.S.
and foreign investors. I23 U.S. persons are subject to a full tax upon an ownership
change in U.S. realty, whether held directly or in corporate solution. Without the
USRPHC rules, however, a foreign person potentially could experience a lower
effective tax liability on such a change in ownership by selling stock in a U.S.
corporation that holds U.S. real estate. 124 Likewise, the immediate tax caused by
the USRPHC rules may advance efficiency by removing the competitive advantage that foreign persons may otherwise experience under the U.S. tax laws with
respect to acquisitions of U.S. real estate. 125

I23See supra note 57 and accompanying text.
124See Blum, supra note 5 at 670 (pointing out the continuing role that the USRPHC rules play

after the GU Repeal is to ensure that the FIRPT A tax cannot be delayed beyond the time of an
ownership change in the U.S. corporation holding the U.S. real estate); cf Feder and Parker, supra
note 114 at 565-66 (discussing and illustrating the lower effective tax that is imposed on sales of
stock in foreign corporations holding U.S. real estate as a result of the exception to the USRPHC
rules for dispositions of foreign stock).
125It should be noted that with respect to equity and efficiency in connection with the ownership of
U.S. real estate, the USRPHC rules have the potential for imposing an immediate tax on more than
just USRPIs, given the general 50% threshold for USRPHC status. See Feder and Parker, supra note
114 at 556-558 (pointing out the USRPHC rules can operate in a capricious way by taxing stock
sales where far less than a majority of a U.S. corporation's holdings by value <;onsist of USRPIs; and
that the gain on the stock sale may relate solely to appreciation in non-USRPIs held by the corporation).
The USRPHC rules may also advance equity and efficiency by providing a possible basis for
taxing a foreign person on a long position in an equity swap with respect to USRPHC stock. Under
an equity swap, a foreign person would enter into an arrangement with a shareholder of a USRPHC
where at the end of each year, the shareholder pays the foreign investor an amount equal to the sum
of distributions on the USRPHC stock during the year, plus any increase in the value of the stock
occurring over the year, and the foreign person pays the shareholder an amount equal to an interest
rate multiplied by the value of the USRPHC stock at the beginning of the year,. plus any decrease in
the value of the stock occurring over the year. See Rubinger, Can a Total Return Equity Swap Avoid
FIRPTA?, J. TAX'N FIN. PRODUCTS (Spring 2003). Even though the foreign person's position is
economically equivalent to a leveraged purchase of USRPHC stock, it is not clear whether FIRPTA,
as currently formulated, applies to this situation. See id. Specifically, the position in the swap may
not constitute an "interest other than solely as a creditor" in a USRPHC within the reach of section
897(a). See id. Moreover, even if the position is treated as an interest subject to FIRPTA, the
payments made under the swap may not constitute amounts received in the disposition of a USRPHC
interest, which is required in order to be taxable under the statute. See id. Whatever the result under
current law, the repeal of the USRPHC rules would likely eliminate any basis for taxing the foreign
person on an equity swap. Nevertheless, it may be possible to advance equity and efficiency in this
situation even without the USRPHC rules. If the USRPHC is a C corporation, then the swap
payments received by the foreign investor (which are based on the change in the value of the
USRPHC stock as well as distributions paid with respect to the stock) should reflect the tax liability
on the appreciation and income at the USRPHC level. Thus, the foreign person should bear an
effective U.S. tax on such payments. If however, the corporation is an S corporation, then the
corporate income that passes through to the actual shareholder should be offset by a deduction for
the payments made to the foreign person pursuant to the swap. Cf Reg. § 1.446-3(c)(l), (d), (e)(3)
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The following example illustrates and attempts to quantify the difference
between an immediate tax and an effective, discounted tax where a foreign
person disposes of stock in a USRPHC. Assume that a foreign corporation owns
all of the stock of a U.S. corporation whose only asset is improved U.S. real
estate with a fair market value of $5,000,000 and an adjusted basis of $3,000,000.
Assume also that the U.S. corporation is subject to U.S. tax at a flat rate of 35%.
If the U.S. corporation were to sell the real estate for $5,000,000 and then
liquidate, the foreign corporate owner would indirectly incur a U.S. tax of
$700,000,126 leaving $4,300,000 after federal income taxes. Now assume that the
USRPHC rules are repealed. If the foreign corporation is able to locate a buyer
who is willing to purchase the stock of the U.S. corporation and not liquidate the
company,127 the foreign corporation would be able to avoid an immediate tax on
the disposition of the corporate-held real estate. However, it can be expected that
the buyer would reduce the purchase price by at least an amount equal to the
present value of the tax attributable to depreciation deductions that will be lost
due to forgoing an increase in the basis of the real estate. 128 Assuming that (i) all
of the foregone basis is depreciable, (ii) the recovery period for the property is
40 years (and the buyer intends to hold the realty for this period), and (iii) the
discount rate is five percent, a reduction in the purchase price to reflect the lost
depreciation should amount to approximately $300,000. 129 Consequently, with
(referring to net deductions from a notional principal contract, which includes equity swaps). Therefore, in the absence of a special rule, the foreign person would not bear an effective U.S. tax on the
swap payments where an S corporation is used. Rather than retain the USRPHC rules for this
situation (which may not tax equity swaps in any event without other changes in the law), Congress
could devise a rule that taxes the foreign person on these swap payments by treating the foreign
investor as a constructive shareholder of the S corporation (but not for purposes of the corporation
qualifying as an S corporation); under this approach, the foreign person would be taxed on her share
of the S corporation's effectively connected income, including any net gain from dispositions of
USRPIs, like that which occurs with respect to foreign persons holding partnership interests. A rule
similar to the approach used in section 897(g) and Revenue Ruling 1991-32 (see supra note 41)
could be employed as well to tax the foreign person upon any disposition of the swap position.
Indeed, because an equity swap can also involve synthetic interests in partnerships and LLCs (see
supra Rubinger n.5), any approach that relied on the USRPHC rules would not be comprehensive in
taxing these equity swaps.
126.35($5,000,000 - $3,000,000) '= $700,000. Upon the liquidation, the foreign corporation would
not be taxed under FIRPTA on any gain realized on the disposition of the stock in the U.S. corporation because of the exception contained in section 897(c)(l)(B). See supra note 96 and accompanyingtext.
12'The next subsection of this Article discusses the likelihood of this occurring.
128Indeed, the buyer will probably insist on further reductions in the purchase price to reflect a
share of the seller's tax benefit, as well as to compensate the buyer for taking on the risk of unknown
corporate liabilities. Cf Irwin D. Segal, Eli Fink and Craig Stem, Foreign Investment in U.S. Real
Estate: No Perfect Structure, 9 1. INT'L TAX'N 22,28 n.28 (May 1998) (noting that it would serve as
a good negotiating position for a stock sale if the seller is willing to reduce the sales price by an
amount that is greater than present value of the tax attributable to the lost depreciation deductions).
129With straight-line depreciation, forgone basis of $2,000,000 would yield $50,000 of depreciation deductions per year for 40 years. With a tax rate of 35%, these deductions would generate
$17,500 of tax savings per year. The present value of $l7,500 paid at the beginping of each year for
40 years, using a discount rate of 5%, is approximately $300,000. If the buyer :had intended to hold
the U.S. real estate for less than its full recovery period, the reduction in the purchase should be
larger; this is because the foregone increase in basis would have been recov/:rable sooner upon a
subsequent disposition of the U.S. realty.
I
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the repeal of the USRPHC rules, the foreign corporation may be able to receive
$4,700,000 as compared to $4,300,000 after taxes under current law, a sizable
difference. 13o
As the example demonstrates, the discounted tax that could apply with the
repeal of the USRPHC rules would be based on the tax rates applying at the
corporate level, which do not contain a capital gains preference (and are as high
as 35%).131 In contrast, a U.S. individual could receive the benefit of the rate
preference for capital gains (which is a maximum of 15% in general and 25%
for unrecaptured section 1250 gain)132 where the U.S. realty is held either directly or through a pass-through entity (such as a limited liability company).
Consequently, even with the repeal of the USRPHC rules, a foreign person may
experience an effective tax rate that is similar to the tax rate applying to a U.S.
individual on U.S. realty gains.133 Moreover, there are other differences in the
U.S. tax treatment of foreign and U.S. persons that are relevant to an equity and
efficiency analysis of the USRPHC rules. As pointed out by Treasury in its 1979
study of the taxation of foreign investment in U.S. real estate, a U.S. person may
have a greater ability than a foreign person to use tax losses that are generated
by U.S. real estate activities; that is, a U.S. person would be able to use the
losses to shelter other U.S. income, but a foreign person may have not have any
other U.S. income that can be sheltered. 134 Granted, the differences in the ability
to use losses may matter less today with the current depreciation lives for re~
alty 135 and the addition of the passive loss rules.136 Nevertheless, these factors
suggest that repealing the USRPHC rules and imposing a discounted tax on a
foreign person's disposition of USRPHC stock may not necessarily produce a
])OAs noted earlier, additional reductions in the purchase price are likely. See supra note 128.
131See LR.C. §§ II and 1201(a).
I32See LR.C. § I (h).
\33The facts of the previous example bear this out. With the repeal of the USRPHC rules, the
foreign investor is subject to an effective tax rate of IS% on the gain from the disposition of the U.S.
realty «$S,OOO,OOO minus $4,700,000) divided by $2,000,000 (the amount of gain». (There are
likely, however, to be further reductions in the purchase price. See supra notes 128, 129). A U.S.
individual holding the realty either directly or through a pass-through entity would also be subject to
a tax rate of IS%, assuming the none of the gain was unrecaptured 12S0 gain (and that the realty was
not dealer property).
I34See DEP'T OF TREASURY, supra note 82 at SO. Indeed, the Treasury study includes an analysis of a
hypothetical investment which showed that a foreign investor would bear a heavier tax burden than a
similarly situated U.S. investor if the foreign investor was subject to tax on U.S. realty gain (and
could make only limited use of her U.S. real estate losses). See id. at 48-SI. The Treasury study
concluded that because some differences favor foreign taxpayers and others favor U.S. taxpayers,
whether foreign persons are better or worse off tax wise than U.S. persons depends on the particular
circumstances of the investment and investor. See id. at SI. It should be noted that foreign persons
could use techniques to enhance their ability to deduct real estate losses, for example, by placing
other U.S. investments in a USRPHC or holding several USRPHCs in a consolidated group. See id.;
George F. Bernardi. A Foreign Investor's Tax Guide to Real Property Investments in the United
States, 20 INT'L TAX J. 39.69 (Fall 1994).
\35See LR.C. § 168(c) (recovery period for residential rental property and nonresidential real
property being 27.S years and 39 years, respectively).
])·See LR.C. § 469. In this connection, the passive loss rules do not apply to widely-held C
corporations, and they apply liberally to closely-held C corporations with respect to their active (that
is, non-portfolio) income. See LR.C. § 469(a)(2), (e)(l), (e)(2).
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lighter U.S. tax burden for foreign persons versus their U.S. counterparts, along
with the resulting equity and efficiency costs.
According to Congress, the USRPHC rules apparently do not advance recognized policies simply because a tax may be imposed on a foreign person's sale
of stock in a U.S. corporation. Such a tax arguably promotes equity (and efficiency) vis-a-vis U.S. investors in U.S. corporate stock who effectively bear two
levels' of U.S. tax on their gains attributable to corporate-held property (at the
corporate and shareholder levels). However, except for the USRPHC rules (and
a few rare situations), I37 the Code does not tax a foreign person on dispositions
of U.S. stock, and Congress has rejected attempts.to do so within the last dozen
years. 138 Moreover, the exception from the section 897 tax for situations where a
U.S. corporation's USRPIs were previously taxed indicates that the USRPHC
rules were not designed to impose a second level of tax on gain attributable to
appreciation in corporate-held real estate. 139 Most well-advised foreign investors
are able to avoid the tax under the USRPHC rules by using this exception. 140
Nevertheless, sometimes the USRPHC rules may impose a second level of tax
on corporate-held property (real estate and/or other assets as weU).141 For example, tax may be imposed on the disposition of a minority stock interest where
the shareholder lacks the necessary control to have the corporation satisfy the
exception contained in the USRPHC rules. To this extent, the USRPHC rules
appear to' conflict with recognized principles. 142
b. Extent of USRPHC Stock Sales if the Rules Were Repealed. Notwithstanding the above analysis addressing the potential equity and efficiency benefits of
the USRPHC rules, the rules do not advance equity and efficiency to the extent
that a foreign person would be subject to an immediate tax on U.S. realty
dispositions absent the rules. That is, a repeal of the USRPHC rules may only
create a loophole to the extent that foreign persons can enjoy such a 100phole. 143
I37See, e.g., l.R.C. § 871(a)(2):
138See H.R. 101-3150, Revenue Reconciliation Bill of 1989, pt. I § 11404 (1989); H.R. 102-5270,
Foreign Income Tax Rationalization and Simplication Act of 1992 (1992); H.R. 104-2491, Balanced
Budget Reconciliation Act of 1995, § 12882 (1995). At least with respect to publicly-traded stock,
administrative considerations are at least partly responsible for the general exemption for stock sales.
Cf Blum, supra note 5 at 645-648 (discussing the administrative burdens in taxing sales of publiclytraded stock); DEP'T OF TREASURY, supra note 82 at 52-53 (pointing out that measures needed to
enforce compliance with respect to a tax on stock sales would seriously burden the market); Shay,
Fleming, Peroni, supra note 43 at 122 (noting the exception for stock gains is justified on the
grounds that the source country lacks a strong claim to tax, and to administer such a tax via
withholding, information regarding basis would be needed; concluding, however, that the exemption
rests largely on administrative and enforcement considerations).
139See supra note 106.
140See Blum, supra note 5 at 674 (pointing out that any well-advised foreign investor will avoid
the tax on USRPHC stock); cf. Kathleen Matthews, FlRPTA Regulations Unfairly Subject Share·
holders to Double Taxation on Inbound Reorganizations, 42 TAX NOTES (TA) 1166 (March 6, 1989)
(witness at IRS hearing commenting that in a post-GU Repeal world, no one is going to sell stock in
a USRPHC).
141Because of the 50% threshold contained in the USRPHC test, the section 897(a) tax on dispositions of U.S. stock can apply to gain that is ,attributable to corporate as-sets other than U.S. real estate.
See Feder and Parker, supra note 114 at 558.
142See Part III~B.I.f for a further discussion of this point.
143See Blum, supra note 5 at 671.
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In order to benefit from a repeal of the USRPHC rules, a foreign person would
have to hold U.S. real property in a USRPHC and then dispose of the USRPHC
stock to avoid a corporate-level tax. That is, a foreign person must engage in a
stock sale without a taxable liquidation of the corporation to benefit from a
repeal of the USRPHC rules. l44 Consequently, in evaluating the equity and efficiency benefits of the USRPHC rules, it is important to consider the extent to
which this would occur if the rules were eliminated.
Nonresident aliens traditionally hold U.S. real estate in a corporate structure.
This structure typically requires the nonresident alien to own stock in a foreign
corporation that in turn would own stock in a U.S. corporation that holds the
U.S. real estate. 145 Structuring the holding of U.S. real estate in this manner
ensures that the nonresident alien will not be subject to the U.S. estate tax, given
that stock in a foreign corporation is not includable in the gross estate of a
nonresident alien. 146 In addition, using a tax haven/foreign corporation with
bearer share certificates would provide the foreign investor with a greater degree
of home country anonymity than alternative structures for investing in U.S. real
estate. 147 By using a U.S. corporation to hold the U.S. real estate as opposed to a
foreign corporation, this structure also avoids the impositiori of the branch profits tax 148 on the income produced by the realty operations. 149 While any dividends paid by the U.S. corporation would subject the shareholder to U.S. tax, the
timing and extent of such taxable dividends can be controlled, unlike the nearly

1""See id.
1"See Robert E. Hudson, Current Techniques/or Foreign Investment in U.S. Real Estate-Income
and Estate Tax Considerations, 22 TAX NOTES INT'L (TA) 3027, 3028, 3039 (200\); See Steven A.
Musher, Revenue Reconciliation Act of 1989 From the Perspective of the Foreign Investor in U.S.
Real Estate, 6 TAX MGMT. REAL EST. 1. 67 (1990).
146LR.C. § 2104(a).
147See Hudson, supra note 145 at 3039; cf Bernardi, supra note 134 at 88 (noting that in general,
using a certain structure that employs tax haven holding corporations apparently may offer the best
solution to reduce U.S. taxes). Nonetheless, foreign investors from countries that have treaties with
United States may choose instead to use home country corporations in order to take advantage of
treaty provisions that override or modify U.S. tax law. See supra Hudson. As discussed below, home
country/ treaty corporations may be used to ov~rride the branch profits tax. See infra note 149. Even
without branch profits tax protection, a foreign investor from a treaty country may still prefer using a
home country corporation in tandem with a U.S. subsidiary to obtain the benefit of treaty provisions
that eliminate or reduce the U.S. withholding tax on interest paid by the U.S. subsidiary to the treaty
parent corporation. See Hudson, supra note 145 at 3042. Howeve,r, potential drawbacks with this
approach (besides the loss of home country anonymity) include limitations on the U.S. subsidiary's
ability to deduct interest under the earnings stripping rules (section 163(j», as well as the fact that
the home country tax rate on the interest payments may be higher than the tax rate applicable in the
United States. See id.
148The branch profits tax imposes a 30% tax on a foreign corporation's dividend equivalent
amount, which is defined generally as the corporation's effectively connected earnings and profits
minus (plus) the corporation's increase (decrease) in U.S. net equity for the particular taxable year.
See LR.C. § 884(a), (b).
1491f the foreign investor is from a country that has a treaty with the United States that overrides
the application of the branch profits, the foreign investor may want to forego interposing a U.S.
corporation and instead have a home country corporation directly hold the U.S. real estate. See
Hudson, supra note 145 at 3040; Sarah O. Austrian and Willys H. Schneider, Tax Aspects of Foreign
Investment in U.S. Real Estate, 45 TAX LAW. 385,432-433 (1992). In this regard, many older U.S.
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automatic nature of the branch profits tax. 150 For the same reason, a foreign
corporate investor typically would prefer to hold U.S. real estate through a U.S.
corporation.
There appears to be, however, increasing interest in using noncorporate structures for holding U.S. real estate by foreign persons. 151 An advantage of holding
real estate either directly or through a limited partnership (or limited liability
company) is lower income tax rates. 152 Although the payment of dividends may
be minimized, the corporate holding structure results in two levels of U.S. tax to
the extent that profits are remitted from the U.S. realty operations, whereas a
direct interest or a partnership structure only involves one level of U.S. tax. 153
Perhaps more importantly, a sale of U.S. realty that is held by a nonresident
alien, either directly or through a pass-through entity, would benefit from preferential capital gains rates, the maximum rate typically being 15%.154 In contrast,
a sale of realty by a U.S. corporation would be subject to the regular corporate
rates that can be as high as 35%.155 A noncorporate structure, however, may
implicate the estate tax. 156 Despite some risk, commentators have referred to
authority for treating a partnership interest as non-U.S. situs property.157 Regardless of whether the partnership is engaged in a U.S. business, such a characterization would exempt nonresident alien investors from the U.S. estate tax. 158
Further, commentators also point out that techniques exist for avoiding estate tax
exposure. 159 Given the income tax advantages, if the planned repeal of the estate

income tax treaties override the branch profits tax (some exceptions being the treaties with Australia,
Canada, and France). See Hudson, supra note 145 at 3040. However, a foreign investor who uses a
home country corporation to hold U.S. real estate will lose home country anonymity, and if such
anonymity is critical, then the tandem foreign parentIV.S. subsidiary structure (using a tax haven
corporation) would probably be the better choice. See id. at 3040-3041.
150See Michael Hirschfeld and Shaul Grossman, Opportunities for the Foreign Investor in U.S.
Real Estate-If Planning Comes First, 94 J. TAX'N 36, 38-39 (2001).
151See Hudson, supra note 145 at 3028.
I52S ee id. at 3028-3029.
I53See id. Generally speaking, the difference between corporate and noncorporate holding structures is reduced somewhat by the application of the new maximum tax rate of 15% that applies to
dividends paid by U.S. corporations (and certain foreign corporations) to individuals. See I.R.C.
§§ I (h) (I ), (II). However, this maximum tax rate on dividends does not apply to dividends received
by foreign individuals that are subject to tax under the FDAP regime contained in section 871(a),
which is the case in this situation.
15'See I.R.c. § I (h).
155See I.R.C. § II.
15 6 See Hudson, supra note 145 at 3029.
157See id. at 3030-3034; cf Michael 1. A. Karlin, Richard A. Cassell, Carlyn S. McCaffrey, and
William P. Streng, U.S Estate Planning for Nonresident Aliens Who Own Pannership Interests,
2003 TAX NOTES TODAY 116-36 (June 16,2003) (reviewing authorities and theories for determining
whether a partnership interest in U.S. situs property for purposes of the U.S. estate tax).
158See Hudson, supra note 145 at 3030.
159See id. at 3030-31, 3045-46.(pointing out that a nonresident alien should be able to avoid the
U.S. estate tax by gifting the partnership interest; referring also to the use of split-interest partnerships to mitigate or eliminate the risk of estate tax exposure); but cf Karlin, Cassell, Cave, McCaffrey,
and Streng, supra note 157 (indicating that there is some U.S. gift tax risk with gifting the partnership interest to avoid the estate tax, in light of the Service's position of not ordinarily ruling on
whether a partnership interest is excludable intangible property for purposes of the gift tax).
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tax 160 is made permanent, a noncorporate structure should be the preferred way
for holding U.S. realty by nonresident aliens.
It appears that any preference for a noncorporate holding structure would be
unaffected by eliminating the USRPHC rules. Substituting what effectively constitutes a discounted tax for an immediate tax in the corporate situation would
likely not offset the advantages in the noncorporate situation of a single level of
tax on operating income and a capital gains tax on appreciated real estate.
Moreover, as discussed below,t61 there likely would be obstacles to disposing of
the realty by selling the USRPHC stock and thus obtaining the benefit of the
discounted tax .
. Assuming that a foreign person does employ a corporate structure for holding
U.S. real estate, the question then becomes to what extent would the repeal of
the USRPHC rules lead to dispositions of the realty through U.S. stock sales
rather than asset sales. One obstacle to stock sales would be tax considerations.
While it can be expected that the purchaser would pay a reduced price for the
USRPHC stock to make up for the lack of a stepped-up basis in the realty, some
buyers apparently would rather receive a stepped-up basis than attempt to quantify the future tax liability through a purchase price adjustment. 162 Moreover, the
potential would still exist for two levels of federal tax on future income and
future gain from the corporate realty.163 A U.S. individual buyer might avoid two
levels of tax by electing S corporation status for the USRPHC,I64 although there
would be the potential for additional subchapter S taxes if the corporation has
accumulated earnings and profits from its days as a C corporation. 165 Further, an
S corporation that purchases the USRPHC stock could elect to treat the USRPHC
as a branch for tax purposes. 166 A partnership or LLC as the buyer of the USRPHC
stock could not, however, avail itself of the S corporation election. 167 Nevertheless, a publicly-traded U.S. corporation or partnership might be an eligible

160See l.R.C. § 2210(a).
161 See infra notes 162-173 and accompanying text.
162Cf William H. Newton III, Structuring Foreign Investment in U.S. Real Estate, 50 U. MIAMI L.
REv. 517, 518 (1996) (noting that despite the ARPTA exception for dispositions of stock in a
foreign corporation, disposition of a USRPI by a foreign corporation is typically necessary for a
prospective buyer to obtain a stepped-up basis in corporate assets (as well as to avoid unknown
corporate liabilities)).
163ln theory, the purchase price could be further reduced to reflect this additional future tax
liability, but practically it would be' difficult to quantify these future tax costs. Moreover, with these
added costs of continued corporate ownership of the realty, there may be no overall tax savings
resulting from a stock sale verses an asset sale that can be shared by the parties.
I"'See Blum, supra note 5 at 672 (pointing out that to avoid a corporate tax under section 1374 on
the built-in gain on the real estate, a corporate sale of the real estate would have to be delayed for
more than ten years after the S election is made).
165See I.R.C. §§ 1362(d)(3), 1375. In addition, some states do not recognize S corporation status.
See Blum, supra note 5 at 672-673.
166See I.R.C. § 1361(b)(3) (allowing this qualified subchapter S subsidiary election for 100%
owned subsidiaries) .
. 167 See l.R.c. § 1361(b)(1)(B) (generally excluding persons other than individuals as eligible S
corporation shareholders).
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purchaser of stock in a USRPHC given that these entities already face two levels
of tax on their income. 168 And, a foreign person might be willing to buy stock in
a USRPHC because a corporate holding structure may be advantageous in light
of the U.S. estate tax (and branch profits tax).169 However, a foreign buyer might
also accept stock in a foreign corporation that holds U.S. realty through a U.S.
corporation, and dispositions of foreign stock are not subject to FIRPT A. 170
Consequently, the repeal of the USRPHC rules may not open up any loophole
that already does not exist, 17l a point that is expanded upon in the next subsection of this Article.
A second and perhaps more important obstacle to such stock sales would be
the general aversion to purchasing real estate in corporate solution because of
the concern over unknown corporate liabilities. I72 Indeed, even though a sale of
stock in a foreign real estate holding corporation is exempt from FIRPTA, a sale
of foreign stock does not appear to be a popular technique for disposing of the
underlying realty.173 Consequently, it appears that for both tax and nontax reasons, not many buyers would be willing to acquire U.S. real estate by purchasing
stock in a USRPHC and refraining from liquidating the company.
c. Ability to Avoid the USRPHC Rules by Selling Stock in a Foreign Corporation. The preceding analysis suggests that the equity and efficiency costs of
repealing the USRPHC rules' may not be significant due to tax arid non tax
limitations on the ability of foreign persons to enjoy any resulting loophole. The
equity and efficiency costs of eliminating the USRPHC rules may be further
minimized to the extent that a foreign person can avoid the rules by disposing of
corporate-held U.S. real estate by selling stock in a foreign corporation-a disposition that is exempt from FIRPTA. 174 Consequently, in evaluating the equity
and efficiency benefits of retaining the USRPHC rules, it is important to determine to what extent a foreign person can avoid an immediate tax on a disposition of corporate-held U.S. real estate by taking advantage of this existing gap in
FIRPTA.175

168Both types of entities are taxed as C corporations. See LR.C § 1361(b)(l)(A) (limit of 75
shareholders in order to elect S corporation status); LRC § 7704(a) (publicly-traded partnerships
treated as corporations).
169In the case of a nonresident alien, such a purchase should be through a foreign corporation. See
supra notes 145-150 and accompanying text.
l70See supra note 97 and accompanying text.
l7lSee Blum, supra note 5 at 673-674.
172See, e.g., id. at 672; Newton, supra note 162.
173See Musher, supra note 145; Newton, supra note 162; Segal, Fink, and Stem, supra note 128;
William J. Bricker, Structuring Foreign Investments in U.S. Real Property: United States Tax Aspects, 430 PLIffAX 391, 476 (1998). This may be due in part to the tax treatment of aU.S. person
who purchases stock in a foreign corporation, and the greater concern over unknown corporate
liabilities with regard to the tax haven corporations that are typically used to indirectly hold USRPls.
These aspects are discussed in the next subsection.
174See supra note 97.'
175Cf Feder and Parker, supra note 114 at 565-566 (analyzing the tax benefit that a foreign person
can obtain by using the foreign stock exception to the USRPHC rules and stating that the treatment
offoreign stock sales may be "a partial gap in FIRPTA's otherwise solid front").
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As discussed above, nonresident aliens that use the corporate structure to hold
U.S. real estate typically would hold stock in a foreign corporation which in tum
holds stock in a USRPHC. 176 As a result, even with the USRPHC rules, a
nonresident alien can avoid an immediate U.S. tax on an ownership change in
the realty by disposing of stock in the foreign corporation. 177 However, for tax
reasons U.S. persons would probably not be willing to purchase stock in such a
foreign corporation. 17s U.S. individuals (either directly or through pass-through
entities such as partnerships) would probably not want to hold U.S. realty in this
manner because of the possibility of three levels of U.S. tax on the operating
income generated by the real estate activities: a tax at the USRPHC level,179 a
second U.S. tax on dividends paid by the USRPHC to the foreign corporation, ISO
and a third U.S. tax either automatically through one of the Code's anti-deferral
regimes lSI or on dividends paid by the foreign corporation to the U.S. individuals. IS2 While such a purchaser could liquidate the foreign corporation to prevent
a level of tax on distributed profits, the liquidation would result in a corporate
level tax on the gain inherent in the USRPHC stock ls3 (which should reflect the
appreciation in the underlying realty). Consequently, a liquidation would produce an immediate U.S. tax, thus defeating any tax reason for engaging in a
stock sale. Similarly, the prospect of multiple U.S. taxation of operating profits
would likely deter U.S. corporations and publicly-traded U.S. partnerships from
holding U.S. real estate in foreign corporate solution. l84 And, the liquidation of
the foreign corporation by a U.S. corporation or partnership that acquires the
stock in the foreign corporation would be a taxable event. Although it is generally possible to have a tax-free liquidation of a foreign corporation that is at least
80% owned by a U.S. corporation (which would include a publicly-traded U.S.
partnership),IS5 the Treasury and Service have issued regulations that tax the

17°See supra notes 145-150 and accompanying text. A foreign corporate investor typically would
hold U.S. real estate through a USRPHC in order to avoid the application of the branch profits tax on
the operating income produced by the real estate activity. See supra notes 148-150 and accompanying text.
I77See Segal, Fink, and Stem, supra note 128 at 28 (discussing the possibility of a sale of foreign
stock, but also pointing out that for tax and nontax reasons buyers will generally prefer asset
acquisitions). And a foreign corporate investor in U.S. real estate could do the same by interposing
another foreign corporation between itself and the USRPHC.
I78S ee Blum, supra note 5 at 651-652 (pointing out that a U.S. person would not want to purchase
stock in a foreign corporation having a U.S. subsidiary unless the foreign corporation can be liquidated tax free). As discussed above, a stock purchase, whether it be foreign or U.S. stock, may also
be deterred for nontax reasons, that is, the concern over unknown corporate liabilities. See supra
notes 172-173 and accompanying text. Indeed, there would probably be an even greater concern in
purchasing stock in the tax haven corporations that are typically used to indirectly hold USRPls.
I79See 1.R.c. § II.
180See 1.R.c. § 881(a).
181See 1.R.c. §§ 951(a), 952(a)(2), 954(a)(l), (c)(l)(A), (c)(3)(A)(i) (subpart F rules); I.R.C. §§ 1293,
1297 (PFlC rules); I.R.C. §§ 551, 552 (foreign personal holding company rules).
1821.R.C. § I.
1831.R.C. §§ 336(a) and 897(a),(c),(d).
184e! supra notes 178-182 and accompanying text.
1851.R.C. §§ 332(a), 337(a), 897(d)(2).
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foreign corporation upon such a liquidation on the gain realized by the foreign
seller on the sale of the foreign corporation's stock to the U.S. corporation. 186
The regulations also tax other techniques for eliminating the foreign corporation l87 or effectively converting it into a U.S. corporation for purposes of
FIRPTA.188
On the other hand, a foreign buyer may be willing to accept stock in a foreign
corporation, assuming that the corporate holding structure is preferred, the buyer
is willing to forego a stepped-up basis in the underlying U.S. real estate (and
other corporate assets) in return for a reduced purchase price, and the buyer is
not dissuaded from engaging in a stock acquisition because of liability concerns.
While such a structure potentially would result in two levels of U.S. tax on the
operating profits from the real estate activities, it is assumed that U.S. estate tax
and branch profits tax considerations dictate the use of a corporate structure. 189
Therefore, under the very conditions that would allow a foreign person to enjoy
the gap that would be created by the repeal of the USRPHC rules,190 it may be
possible to avoid the rules in any event by selling foreign stock to a foreign
person. 191 Consequently, it can be argued that retaining the USRPHC rules

186See Reg. § 1.897-5T(c)(2), as modified by Notice 1989-85, 1989-2 C.B. 403.
18'See Reg. § 1.897-5T(c)(4), as modified by Notice 1989-85, 1989-2 C.B. 403 (C, D, and F

reorganizations); Reg. § 1.897-5T(c)(3) (section 355 distributions).
1"See Reg. § 1.897-3(c)(5), as modified by Notice 1989-85, 1989-2 c.B. 403 (election by a
foreign corporation under section 897(i) to be treated as a U.S. corporation for purposes of FlRPTA).
1.9See supra notes 145-150 and accompanying text.
1905ee supra notes 162-173 and accompanying text.
1915ee Segal, Fink and Stem, supra note 128 at 28, n.28 (noting that it should not be impossible to
sell foreign stock where the seller is willing to share some of tbe tax savings resulting from FlRPTA
not applying to the disposition; pointing out, however, that buyers generally prefer asset acquisitions
of U.S. real estate); Bernardi, supra note l34 at 82 (pointing out tbat a tax advantage with a certain
structure for holding a USRPHC through a tax haven (known as an "open-face Dutch sandwich") is
tbat the ultimate foreign investors can sell the stock in the foreign holding corporations free of the
FlRPTA withholding tax); cf Renfroe, Fogarasi, Gordon, and Venuti, supra note 108 at 1419, 14241425 (pointing out that to postpone a proposed U.S. tax on gain derived by a ten percent foreign
shareholder from a disposition of stock in a U.S. corporation, a foreign investor could transfer tbe
U.S. stock to a foreign holding corporation and then sell tbe stock in the foreign corporation). It
should be noted tbat a special nonrecognition rule appears to be aimed at restricting a foreign
person's ability to use tbe foreign stock exception. Specifically, Regulation section 1.897-6T(b)
denies nonrecognition treatment on a foreign corporation's transfer of a USRPI to another foreign
corporation (a transaction that normally may receive nonrecognition treatment under section 351 or a
reorganization provision), unless eitber (i) tbe exchange qualifies as a type C (in general), acquisitive
D, or F reorganization (as described in section 368), or (ii) the property transferred is stock in a
USRPHC, the exchange qualifies under section 351 or section 354 (in connection with a B reorganization), in general, and tbe recipients of tbe foreign stock received in tbe exchange refrain from
selling tbe stock for at least three years following tbe exchange. In addition to these requirements,
for nonrecognition treatment to occur, in general, either (i) none of tbe foreign corporations involved
would have been USRPHCs if they were U.S. corporations, (ii) the transferee corporation is from a
treaty country that has an exchange of information agreement with the United States and the transferee corporation waives all treaty benefits, (iii) the transferee corporation is a qualified resident (as
defined in section'884(e)) of-its home country, (iv) the transferee and transferor corporations are
from the same country and that country has a treaty with the United States tbat contains an exchange
of information provision, or (v) tbe transferee and transferor corporations are from tbe same country
and tbe exchange is an F reorganization. This rule prevents a foreign corporation with several
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results in no equity and efficiency benefits.l92
The USRPHC rules may alternatively advance equity and efficiency by effectively limiting the stock acquisition technique to sales to foreign buyers. Given
that a stock acquisition may be unattractive from a liability standpoint,I93 limiting the technique to sales to foreign persons may make it more difficult to find a
willing buyer of stock, and thus the number of such transactions may be considerably lower than without the USRPHC rules. The difficulty in finding a buyer
of stock may well be exacerbated by the increased concern over unknown liabilities with respect to the tax haven corporations that are typically used to hold
USRPHCs. Furthermore, with only foreign persons as potential buyers of stock,
this may depress the price paid for the stock l94 (in addition to any reduction
because of a lack of stepped-up basis in the corporate real estate), thereby
making this technique unattractive from the standpoint of the seller as well. 195
Countering this to a degree is the existence of what seems to be a global market
for U.S. real estate;196 almost all of the major brokerage firms have worldwide

properties from making a nontaxable transfer of a USRPI to anotber foreign corporation in anticipation of selling the stock of tbe transferee foreign corporation. Compare Reg. § 1.897-6T(b)(4),
example (1) (nonrecognition denied where a foreign corporation transfers a directly-held USRPI to
its wholly-owned foreign subsidiary under section 351(a)) with example 2 (nonrecognition permitted
where a foreign corporation transfers substantially all of its assets, including all of its USRPIs, to
another foreign corporation under section 361(a) in an acquisitive D reorganization, where the
transferor and transferee foreign corporations are from tbe same country and this country has a treaty
with the United States that contains an exchange of information provision). Consequently, to tbis
extent the rule limits the ability to use tbe foreign stock exception to the USRPHC rules. Nevertbless,
a foreign person could avoid the need to comply witb tbis rule by holding each USRPI (either
directly or indirectly) through a separate foreign corporation. Cf Bernardi, supra note 134 at 65-67
(recommending that USRPIs be held in separate U.S. corporations in order to allow foreign investors
to buy and sell several properties without incurring a second level of U.S. tax (on a dividend) upon
distributing the proceeds of the sale of a USRPI).
1925ee Blum, supra notes 5 at 673-74 (stating that because a foreign person's disposition of stock
in a foreign holding company is free of U.S. tax, "the repeal of [the USRPHC rules] would not open
up any loophole tbat did not already exist"); cf Dale, supra note 5 at 714-715 (pointing out that
"well advised foreign investors will hold U.S. real estate in foreign corporate solution, and will
dispose of it by selling tbe stock"; "[t]he remaining impact of FIRPTA, then, will fall on tbe poorlyadvised, tbe blunderers, and the few who---for other reasons--cannot use foreign corporate ownership. It is difficult to justify tbe continued existence of the complex FIRPTA tax and withholding
regime for such limited and often-whimsical purposes").
1935ee supra notes 172-173 and accompanying text.
1945ee Blum, supra note 5 at 673.
195However, even witb a further reduction in the price paid for the stock, tbe amount received for
tbe stock may be attractive when compared to the after-tax proceeds of an asset sale. See supra notes
126-130 and accompanying text.
196Even with the existence of such a global market, where a foreign person holds a USRPHC
tbrough a home country/treaty corporation, only foreign persons from that same country would
likely be eligible holders of tbe stock in the treaty corporation. This is because tbe treaty benefits
would probably not be available if foreign persons from other countries owned the stock in the
foreign corporation; and absent the treaty benefits, a foreign person would probably prefer to use a
tax haven corporation to hold the USRPHC. Nevertheless, tbere may be an extensive market for U.S.
real estate even witbin that single treaty country, especially given the fact tbat many of the United
States' treaty partners are developed, populous nations. Alternatively, a foreign person from a nontreaty country could acquire stock in the treaty corporation by using a tax haven corporation to
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operations that offer U.S. real estate to clients in many foreign countries. 197 And,
the recent corporate inversion phenomenon indicates that buyers are not reluctant to purchase stock in tax haven corporations,198 although there may be some
difference in this regard between the publicly-traded corporations used in inversions and the c~osely-held ones used to hold USRPHCs.
d. Gauging the Increase in Stock Sales that Would Result from the Repeal of
the USRPHC Rules. Despite these mitigating factors, the previous analysis suggests that repealing the USRPHC rules will lead to an increase in the number of
situations where foreign persons dispose of U.S. real estate via stock sales. By
opening up this form of acquisition to U.S. buyers, and with any hidden liabilities belonging to a U.S. corporation (as opposed to a tax haven company), it
should be easier to locate a buyer who is willing to acquire U.S. real estate by
way of a stock purchase. In evaluating the equity and efficiency costs of repealing the USRPHC rules, it is important to have a clear sense of the effect on the
manner in which foreign persons dispose of U.S. real estate.
To gain a better understanding of these effects, this Article recommends that
the federal government undertake a study that seeks to gauge the increase in the
number of U.S. real estate dispositions via stock sales that would result from
repealing the USRPHC rules. 199 In conducting this study, the government should
obtain data on sales by foreign persons of U.S. real property (both asset and
stock sales), as well as information from lawyers and real estate professionals on
their experience in structuring real estate transactions under the current rules and
how this would be affected by repealing the USRPHC rules. Such a study may
reveal, for example, that even with repeal and the resulting larger potential
market for stock sales, the concerns over unknown corporate liabilities and a
looming tax liability are so great that buyers would rarely acquire U.S. real
estate by way of a stock acquisition. zoo Or it may be that foreign markets for U.S.

purchase the stock. The tax haven corporation could then liquidate the treaty corporation and receive
the stock in the USRPHC. While the liquidating distribution of the USRPHC stock should be free of
U.S. tax under Regulation section 1.897-5T(c)(2)(ii), there may, however, be tax consequences in
the treaty country. In any event, it appears that foreign persons typically use tax haven corporations,
rather thari treaty corporations, to hold USRPHCs given the general desire for home country anonymity and other factors. See supra note 147-149 and accompanying text.
197 Among the firms providing global real estate services are CB Commercial, Jones Lang LaSalle,
LaSalle Investment Management, and ONCOR International. Further evidence of a global market for
U.S. real estate is the existence of organizations such as the Association of Foreign Investors in Real
Estate ("AFIRE"), which is devoted to the needs of foreign investors in advocating and promoting
international real estate investments.
198C! Treasury Office of Tax Policy, Corporate Inversion Transactions 4 (May 2002) (pointing out
that after the inversion transaction, the former shareholders of the inverted U.S. corporation typically
hold stock in a foreign corporation that is incorporated in a country that imposes little or no income
tax (e.g., Bermuda)).
l""This would be reminiscent of the study that gave rise to FIRPTA. See generally U.S. DEP'T OF
TREASURY, supra note 82.
""'Indeed, there was testimony to this effect during the Senate hearings on the FIRPTA. See
Hearing, supra note 120 (statement of Marshall J. Langer) (claiming that with the elimination of a
step-up in basis upon a corporate liquidation to a purchaser of U.S. realty, virtually nobody would be
willing to buy stock in a U.S. real estate holding corporation).
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real estate are so extensive (and the concern over hidden liabilities with respect
to tax haven corporations not so great) that opening up the stock acquisition
technique to U.S. buyers would have little effect. 201 In either case, these findings
would suggest that repealing the USRPHC rules would have minimal equity and
efficiency costs. On the other hand, a study may indicate that with the primary
market for U.S. real estate being U.S. buyers, opening up the stock acquisition
technique to these buyers will substantially increase the likelihood of disposing
of U.S. realty through a stock sale notwithstanding the corporate liability concerns, thus indicating that the equity and efficiency costs of repeal may indeed
be significant. 202
e. Offsetting Competitive Benefits of Repealing the USRPHC Rules. The
efficiency costs of eliminating the USRPHC rules would be offset to a degree by
the competitive benefits that would flow to U.S. purchasers as a result of repealing the rules. As discussed previously, the efficiency basis of FIRPTA supports
having more similar tax treatment of foreign and U.S. investors in U.S. real
estate in order to allow U.S. purchasers to compete more effectively with their
foreign counterparts. 203 The repeal of the USRPHC rules may further this efficiency goal incrementally by allowing U.S. buyers to compete on an equal
footing with foreign buyers (to a degree) where a foreign person desires to
dispose of U.S. real estate via a stock sale.
Under the current rules, a foreign buyer would have a competitive advantage
over a U.S. buyer in purchasing U.S. real estate from a foreign person, because
the former may be willing to engage in a stock acquisition whereas the latter
probably would not. 204 For example, assume that a nonresident alien owns all of
the stock of a foreign corporation, which in tum owns all of the stock of a U.S.
corporation whose only asset is improved U.S. real property with a fair market
value of $3,000,000 and adjusted basis of $2,000,000. Assume that the present
value of the tax benefits attributable to a step up in the adjusted basis of the
realty is $100,000. Assume also that the U.S. corporation is subject to U.S. tax at
a flat rate of 35%. Another nonresident alien offers to purchase the stock in the
foreign corporation for $2,800,000, which represents the value of the real estate,
$3,000,000, less a $100,000 discount for forgoing a stepped-up basis in the
realty, less another $100,000 reduction due to the risk of unknown corporate
liabilities. Because the sale of the foreign stock is not taxable by the United
States, the nonresident alien seller would receive the full $2,800,000. In order

20lIn this regard, it is not inconceivable that despite the primary market for U.S. real estate being
U.S. buyers, foreign sellers can be drawn to foreign markets in order to take advantage of the
FIRPTA exception for dispositions of foreign stock.
202Nevertheless, even with such findings repealing the USRPHC rules may not necessarily result
in a lighter U.S. tax burden for foreign persons versus their U.S. counterparts with respect to U.S.
real estate. See supra notes 131-136 and accompanying text. Moreover, there would still remain the
question as to whether the equity and efficiency benefits of the rules warrant the administrative costs
involved. Part IlI.B.2 examines the administrative costs of the USRPHC rules.
203See supra notes 25-26 and accompanying text.
04
2 See supra notes 178-191 and accompanying text.
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for a U.S. purchaser to provide an equivalent after-tax amount to the seller in an
asset acquisition of the real estate, the U.S. purchaser would have to pay
$3,230,769 for the real estate,20S which is considerably more than the property's
fair market value. Thus, under the current rules it is possible for a foreign buyer
to outbid a prospective U.S. buyer by offering less for the real property, thereby
experiencing a competitive advantage. 206
Repealing the USRPHC rules and opening up the stock acquisition technique
to U.S. buyers would remove this particular competitive advantage. This is not
to suggest, however, that the competitive benefits of repealing the USRPHC
rules necessarily offset any competitive costs of doing so. By eliminating the
USRPHC rules and allowing for more situations where foreign persons can
dispose of their U.S. realty activities by way of stock sales, it may be that the
prospects for lower tax costs on dispositions will induce foreign persons to
outbid their U.S. counterparts for purchases of U.S. realty, and that the amount
of additional U.S. real estate purchased by foreign persons will exceed the
amount of additional U.S. real estate acquired by U.S. persons on sales by
foreign persons. Nevertheless, at a minimum, one should recognize the
countervailing competitive effect of eliminating the USRPHC rules, especially
given what might be a fairly weak efficiency (and equity) case for retaining the
rules.
f. Equity Costs With Respect to Certain Beneficiaries of USRPHC Repeal. As
the previous subsections suggest, the equity and efficiency costs of repealing the
USRPHC rules may be insignificant because of the limited number of dispositions of U.S. real estate via U.S. stock sales, the possible ability to engage in
foreign stock dispositions in any event, and the offsetting competitive benefits
flowing to U.S. buyers. Nevertheless, certain foreign persons who would be
taxed under the USRPHC rules would clearly benefit from their repea1. 207 These
would include foreign investors who may not have an avenue for disposing of

205$3,230,769 - .35($3,230,769 - $2,000,000) =$2,800,000.
206Cf Matthews, supra note 140 at 1166, 1167-68 (commentators claiming that Regulation section
1.897-5T(c), which serves as a backstop to the USRPHC rules by taxing a liquidation of a foreign
real estate holding corporation by its U.S. parent following an acquisition of the foreign corporation
by the parent, places widely-held U.S. corporations seeking to acquire U.S. real estate owned by
foreign persons at a competitive disadvantage verses their foreign counterparts, given that a V.S.
purchaser would need to liquidate the foreign corporation in order to get the real estate into the U.S.
corporate group); Benjamin G. Wells and James A. Baker, IV, Baker and Botts Say FIRPTA Regulations Should Allow Deferral of Tax on Inbound Reorganizations When u.s. Property Remains in
Domestic Hands, 88 TAX NOTES TODAY (TA) 140-39 (similarly pointing out that Treasury Regulation
section 1.897-5T(c) places acquiring U.S. corporations at a competitive disadvantage versus their
foreign counterparts). Carolyn Joy Lee, NYSBA Urges Tax Writers to Scrap Proposed Foreign
Shareholder Tax, 95 TAX NOTES INT'L (TA) 225-13 (Nov. 22, 1995) (in commenting on 1989
proposal to impose U.S. tax on net gains derived by ten percent foreign shareholders on dispositions
of stock in V.S. corporations, NYSBA points out that on sales to foreign purchasers, foreign shareholders are likely to have more flexibility in structuring the transactions to avoid the tax than with
respect to sales to V.S. purchasers; concluding that the heaviest burden of the tax would likely fall
on sales to U.S. purchasers).
2°'As mentioned previously, most well-advised foreign investors will avoid the tax under the
VSRPHC rules. See supra note 140 and accompanying text.
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their interests other than by way of a disposition of stock in a USRPHC: for
example, a foreign person who disposes of her minority interest in a USRPHC
via a sale to another person or a stock redemption. Also included are foreign
persons who, as a result of poor or no tax advice, sell stock in a USRPHC, as
opposed to having the USRPHC sell the underlying U.S. real estate or selling
shares in a foreign holding company.
With the USRPHC rules, these taxpayers are effectively subject to two levels
of tax with regard to their interests in U.S. real estate-a tax on the gain recognized on the disposition of the USRPHC stock, plus a likely reduction in the
purchase price of the shares to reflect a portion of the future tax liability at the
corporate level. In contrast, with a repeal of the USRPHC rules only an effective, discounted tax would apply in these situations.
While there is some uncertainty, it appears that repealing the USRPHC rules
brings about the more equitable result with respect to these taxpayers. Although
equity vis-a-vis U.S. persons may be served by imposing two levels of tax on a
foreign person's gains that are attributable to holdings in U.S. corporations, the
current policy (which this Article assumes to be correct)208 is that foreign persons are generally not subject to two levels of U.S. tax on their gains attributable
to property held in U.S. corporate solution. 209 Moreover, equity is not advanced
by exacting a second level of tax only with respect to those foreign persons who
are unable to take advantage of exceptions thereto, either because of their particular circumstances or a lack of tax expertise. And while subjecting these
foreign persons to a discounted tax on their U.S. realty gains violates equity visa-vis U.S. persons, it advances equity with respect to foreign persons who have
the ability and wherewithal to dispose of U.S. real estate via sales of foreign
stock. Consequently, it appears that repealing the USRPHC rules would not
produce equity costs with regard to the class of foreign persons who would
otherwise be taxed under the rules.
2. Administrability

The USRPHC rules appear to produce significant administrative costs for
both taxpayers and the government. Some of these costs are due to the USRPHC
rules themselves, while other administrative costs result from several ancillary
provisions. This section examines these two categories of complexity caused by
the USRPHC rules.
a. Direct Costs of USRPHC Rules. Although the section 897 tax on stock
sales applies infrequently,2IO the USRPHC rules appear to create considerable
administrative burdens for both taxpayers and the IRS because of its potential

208See supra note 122 and accompanying text.
209ln particular, the USRPHC rules were not designed as a second level of tax on U.S real estate
held in U.S. corporate solution. See supra note 139 and accompanying text.
210See supra note 140 and accompanying text; Blum, supra note 5 at 674 (noting that the tax under
the USRPHC rules rarely applies).
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applicability.211 Under the USRPHC rules, buyers of stock in privately-held U.S.
corporations are generally required to withhold tax under section 1445 unless
the seller is not a foreign person or the corporation has not been a USRPHC
within the previous five years.212 Consequently, the buyer ordinarily needs to
obtain from the seller a certificate of non-foreign status in order to determine
that she is not subject to a withholding obligation. 213 A foreign seller can avoid
withholding by obtaining, before the sale, a determination from the corporation
that it has not been a USRPHC within the testing period. 214 Alternatively, the
foreign seller can request the corporation or the IRS to make such a determination after the sale and file a refund claim for overwithheld taxes.215
The determination of USRPHC status by either the U.S. corporation or the
IRS involves significant rule ,complexity and potential factual uncertainty. Testing for USRPHC status requires a determination as to whether the fair market
value of the corporation's USRPIs equals or exceeds 50% of the sum of the fair
market value of the corporation's USRPIs, foreign real property, and other assets
used or held for use in a trade or business. 216 Consequently, the application of
the test may well involve factual uncertainty regarding the fair market value of
property,217 as well as whether property is considered as used or held for use in a
business.218 A corporation may rely upon an alternative book value test that
creates a presumption of non-USRPHC status if the accounting book value of
the corporation's USRPIs is 25% or less of the aggregate book value of its
relevant assets. 219 However, a corporation exceeding this lower threshold must
establish fair market values for purposes of the general test, and the Service can
rebut the presumption of non-USRPHC status based on information as to the fair
market values of the corporation's assets.220 The regulations require that the
corporation be tested for USPRHC status on "determination dates."221 The deter-

2lJSee, e.g., Blum, supra note 5 at 674; Letter from New York Bar Ass'n Tax Section to House
Ways and Means Comm., supra note 5.
212See I.R.C. § I 445(a), (b)(2), (b)(3); Reg. § 1.1 445-2(b), (c).
2l3See Reg. § 1.1 445-2(b)(2).
214See Reg. §§ 1.1445-2(c)(3), 1.897-2(g), -2(h).
215See Reg. § 1.897-2(g). Issues regarding USRPHC status can also arise during Service audits.
See I.R.M. 4233, § 4.61.12.5 (Service instructions to its examiners on determining USRPHC status
during audits); see also Charles D. Rubin, New Audit Guidelines in the IRS Manual Target FIRPTA
Transactions, 80 J. TAX'N 170 (1994) (describing an earlier version of the audit guidelines for
FIRPTA transactions).
216I.R.C. § 897(c)(2).
217See Reg. § 1.897-1(0) (traditional valuation methods used); Kaplan, supra note 42 at 1106
(noting that appraisals of real estate often vary considerably and thus determining whether a corporation is a USRPHC with any confidence may be difficult).
218See Reg. § 1.897-1(f) (suggesting a fact-specific inquiry); RUFUS RHOADES & MARSHALL J. LANGER,
U.S. 1NrERNATIONAL TAXATION AND TAX TREATIES, 'lI 31.03 (noting the uncertainty of whether cash and
treasury bills constitute assets used or held for use in a trade or business).
219See ~eg. § 1.897-2(b)(2). See Hirschfeld and Grossman, supra note 150 at 41 (noting that the
book value of assets is fairly easy to determine).
220See Reg. § 1.897-2(b)(2)(iii).
221See Reg. § 1.897-2(c). The statute, taken literally, suggests that a continuous monitoring of the
USRPHC fraction is required. The regulations mitigate this apparent statutory requirement by creating the determination date mechanism. See Rubin and Hudson, supra note 34 at A-32.
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mination date mechanism is a source of considerable complexity because testing
is required on the last day of the corporation's taxable year, as well as on the
date of any transaction that could potentially cause the corporation to become a
USRPHC,222 with the latter category subject to a very intricate set of exceptions.223 For situations where the U.S. corporation owns controlling interests in
other corporations, or interests in noncorporate entities, the statute and regulations treat the corporation as owning a proportionate share of the assets of the
other entity for purposes of applying the USRPHC test224-another set of provisions that appears to be a source of intricacy and factual uncertainty.
Even though it is quite atypical for a foreign person to dispose of U.S. real
estate by way of a sale of U.S. corporate stock, frequent determinations of
USRPHC status may still be necessary. This is because such determinations
must be made throughout a corporation's existence, and the threshold for being
a USRPHC is no greater than 50% of the corporation's assets consisting of
USRPls.225 Thus, a privately-held U.S. corporation owning a business which
includes U.S. real property (e.g., manufacturing) would need to determine its
status as a USRPHC at least annually if it has any foreign shareholders,226
because of the possibility that one of the foreign shareholders will dispose of her
stock. 227 Consequently, even with their limited applicability, eliminating the
USRPHC rules would produce simplification benefits by sparing foreign taxpayers (and their advisers) the burden of understanding and complying with the
rules. 228
The USRPHC rules also provide several planning opportunities and traps for
the unwary. As discussed previously,229 a foreign person could avoid the USRPHC

222See Reg. § 1.897-2(c)(l); Rubin and Hudson, supra note 34 at A-32.
223See Reg. § 1.897-2(c)(2). In lieu of using the general approach for determination dates, the
corporation may elect an alternative approach that requires determination dates at the end of each
month as well as on the dates of certain acquisitions or dispositions of relevant assets. See Reg.
§ 1.897-2(c)(3).
224See 1.R.c. § 897(c)(4)(B), (c)(5); Reg. § 1.897-I(e), -2(e).
225Indeed, the threshold is lower where some of the corporation's assets are other than real
property or trade or business assets. See supra note 216 and accompanying text. Moreover, the
alternative book value presumption standard uses a 25% threshold. See supra note 219 and accompanying text.
226C! Renfroe, Fogarasi, Gordon, and Venuti, supra note 108 at 1416 (in describing the taxpayers
that would be affected by the proposed U.S tax on dispositions of U.S. stock by ten percent foreign
shareholders, noting that foreign investors in privately-held U.S. corporations include foreign raiders, mutual funds, leveraged buyout funds, partnerships, as well as foreign parent corporations).
mC! Austrian and Schneider, supra note 149 at 401 (pointing out that a U.S. corporation owning
a U.S. manufacturing plant will be a USRPHC where the value of its real property is relatively
significant).
mC! STAFF OF THE JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, supra note I at 437,442 (noting similar simplification benefits ofrepealing sections 86I(a)(2)(B) and 871(a)(2». As previously discussed, this Article
recommends that the federal government undertake a study that seeks to gauge the increase in the
number of U.S. real estate dispositions via stock sales that would result from repealing the USRPHC
rules. See supra note 199 and accompanying text. In connection with this study, it is recommended
that the government further analyze the administrative burdens that result from the USRPHC rules
by obtaining input from tax advisers and Service personnel.
229See generally Part m.B.I.c.
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rules by disposing of stock in a foreign corporation that holds the USRPHC. 230
Another technique would be to keep the U.S. corporation's percentage ofUSRPIs
below the 50% threshold during the testing period. 23I Where a disposition of
stock in a USRPHC does occur, the holder can avoid the tax on the stock
disposition by selling the USRPIs and distributing the proceeds in liquidation. 232
A sale of USRPHC stock to the buyer presents a particularly egregious trap for
the poorly advised, in that the seller would suffer an avoidable tax in addition to
bearing, most likely, a portion of the tax liability at the corporate level.
b. Costs of Ancillary Rules. There are several regulatory provisions ancillary
to the USRPHC rules that serve as backstops to circumventing the rules. For
example, the Treasury has issued regulations that provide for tax on a liquidating foreign corporation with respect to prior dispositions of the corporation's
stock, where it distributes USRPIs to its U.S. parent corporation in what otherwise would be a tax-free liquidation under sections 332 and 337.233 The USRPIs
held by the foreign corporation typically would be in the form of stock in a
USRPHC because of branch profits tax concems. 234 In light of GU Repeal, the
distributed USRPIs would continue to be subject to U.S. taxation in the hands of
the U.S. corporate distributee. 235 Consequently, Treasury's purpose for modifying nonrecognition treatment is apparently to tax the disposition of foreign stock
in situations where a U.S. transferee ultimately receives stock in a USRPHC. 236
Stated differently, without this provision a foreign person could effectively transfer
USRPHC stock to a U.S. corporate buyer and avoid the USRPHC rules by first

230See Dale, supra note 5 at 714-715 (pointing out that because of the ability to avoid the USRPHC
rules by selling stock in a foreign corporation, the remaining impact of the rules after the au Repeal
will fall on the poorly advised, among others).
21 ' Alternatively, in some circumstances a foreign shareholder may be able to wait until the end of
the five year period of taint (contained in section 897(c)( I )(A)(ii)) before disposing of stock in a
U.S. corporation.
232See supra note 96 and accOl)1panying text. In this regard, it should be noted that the regulations
aim to prevent a "loss stuffing" technique under which a foreign person contributes depreciated
property to a U.S. corporation with the intention of recognizing losses at the corporate level in order
to offset any gain recognized by the corporation on the disposition of USRPIs. See Reg. § 1.8976T(c)(2) (not allowing the use of losses upon sales or exchanges in certain circumstances). Because
of this technique's potential for avoiding a corporate level U.S. tax on gain attributable to appreciation in USRPls, it might be wise to retain this anti-avoidance measure even if the USRPHC rules are
eliminated.
mSee Reg. § 1.897-5T(c)(2), as modified by Notice 1989-85, 1989-2 C.B. 403.
234See supra notes 148-150 and accompanying text.
2l5See I.R.C. § 336(a).
236C! Matthews, supra note 140 at 1166 (the drafters' intent was to put the selling shareholders of
an inbound foreign corporation in the same U.S. tax position as they would have been if the
corporation had always been a U.S. corporation); NYSBA Tax Section Comments on FIRPTA Nonrecognition Regulations, 89 TAX NOTES TODAY (TA) 30-57 (Feb. 7, 1989) (speculating that the
reason for the rule is to impose a surrogate U.S. tax on foreign persons' prior sales of foreign stock
in order to require a toll charge for the domestication of a foreign corporation holding USRPls like
that which occurs when a section 897(i) is made); Robert F. Hudson, Florida Bar Tax Section
Opposes Complexity and Double Taxation Under Section 897 Regulations, 88 TAX NOTES TODAY
(TA) 155-34 (1988) (referring to the regulations' objective of imposing a surrogate tax on sales of
foreign stock by foreign persons where a foreign corporation is domesticated) [hereinafter "Hudson,
Florida Bar Comments"].
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selling stock in a foreign corporation that holds a USRPHC and then having the
buyer liquidate the foreign corporation. 237 Thus, the provision appears to be
primarily a backstop to circumventing the USRPHC rules. In addition, the regulations provide backstops to the USRPHC rules by similarly taxing other techniques of eliminating a foreign corporation following a disposition of its stock,
by using a reorganization or section 355 distribution. 238 These backstops to the
USRPHC rules not only result in significant rule complexity,239 but also can
require the cumbersome task of determining the amount of tax plus interest on
the gain from all prior dispositions of stock in the foreign corporation. 240 Of
course, if the USRPHC rules were eliminated, then these backstop provisions
should be eliminated as welL241
Other regulatory provisions serve an ancillary function by promoting the policy
underlying the USRPHC rules after GU Repeal. For example, the regulations
provide that upon an exchange of a USRPI for stock in a U.S. corporation,
nonrecognition treatment under section 351 will apply only if the U.S. corporation is a USRPHC immediately after the exchange. 242 In a post-GU repeal world,
the transferred USRPI will continue to be subject to U.S. taxation, regardless of
whether the corporate transferee is a USRPHC. 243 However, in the absence of
this rule, a foreign person could transfer a USRPI to a U.S. corporation that is
not a USRPHC immediately after the exchange, obtain nonrecognition treatment
on the exchange,244 and then sell the U.S. stock in a transaction free of U.S.

mAs discussed previously, a U.S. person typically would not want to hold a USRPHC through a
foreign corporation. See supra notes 178-88 and accompanying text.
238See Reg. § 1.897-5T(c)(4), as modified by Notice 1989-85, 1989-2 C.B. 403 (C, D, and F
reorganizations); Reg. § 1.897-5T(c)(3) (section 355 distributions).
239See BmKER AND EUSTICE, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION OF CORPORATIONS AND SHAREHOLDERS, 'lI
15.85[I][b) n.949 (Supp. 2002) (describing Regulation sections 1.897-5T and 1.897-6T as truly
awful provisions that are extraordinarily complex); Hudson, Florida Bar Comments, supra note 236
(noting that these rules add a tremendous amount of complexities).
40
2 See Notice 1989-85, 1989-2 C.B. 403 (in the case of section 332 liquidations as well as C, D,
and F reorganizations that are subject to these provisions, requiring that the foreign corporation pay
an amount equal to all taxes, plus interest, that would have been imposed on all dispositions of stock
in the foreign corporation after June 18, 1980 as if the corporation were a U.S. corporation on the
date of the dispositions).
241An additional reason for eliminating the backstop provisions with the repeal of the USRPHC
rules is that these provisions as written would be substantially ineffective without the USRPHC
concept. That is, under current law the distributions of USRPIs that typically fall within the scope of
these provisions are distributions of stock in USRPHCs. Therefore, without the USRPHC rules, the
interests distributed would not be USRPIs, and thus the provisions would not apply, nor would there
be taxable gain in any event. See Feingold and Glicklich, supra note 5 at 264 n.17 (noting that
whether a foreign transferor of USRPHC stock recognized gain would matter little if the gain were
not subject to tax). Of course, if it is decided on policy grounds to retain the backstop provisions
even with the elimination of the USRPHC rules (which would be wrong), Congress could retain the
USRPHC rules solely for these provisions. Consequently, a policy basis for eliminating these provisions is warranted.
24'See Reg. § 1.897-6T(a)(I).
243See I.R.C. § 336(a).
244See I.R.C. § 351.
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tax. 245 Consequently, an apparent purpose for this rule is to prevent the possibility of an ownership change in a USRPI without the imposition of an immediate
U.S. tax-the policy underlying the USRPHC rules after GU RepeaJ.246 Similarly, the regulations 247 which restrict nonrecognition treatment on transfers of
USRPIs to foreign corporations promote the immediate tax policy underlying
the USRPHC rules by limiting the ability to use the foreign stock sale exception
to the USRPHC rules; the USRPIs would continue to be subject to U.S. taxation
in the hands of the foreign corporation in light of GU Repeal (and mini repeal,
per section 897(d)(1» and the fact that FIRPTA overrides any treaties to the
contrary.248 These foreign-to-foreign exchange rules are a particularly intricate
set of provisions, with nonrecognition treatment dependent on meeting detailed
requirements regarding the structure and circumstances of the transaction. 249 If
the USRPHC rules were repealed, and the "immediate tax" policy was thus
abandoned,250 these special nonrecognition rules can be eliminated as well.251

245See I.R.C. § 897(a), (c)(I)(A)(ii).
246See supra note 106 and accompanying text. This rule can also serve as a backstop to the
USRPHC rules by preventing the tax-free transfer of USRPHC stock to another U.S. corporation that
is not a USRPHC after the exchange, in anticipation of selling the new stock. It should be noted that
while these policies underlie Regulation section 1.897-6T(a), the real impetus for the regulation may
well have been the language of section 897(e)(I). This subsection generally provides that nonrecognition provisions will apply for purposes of section 897 only where a USRPI is exchanged for
property that would be subject to U.S. tax upon its sale. Nonetheless, based on the authority granted
under section 897(e)(2), Treasury did carve out some exceptions in providing for nonrecognition
treatment on certain transfers of USRPIs to foreign corporations. See Reg. § 1.897-6T(b), which is
described in note 191.
247Reg. § 1.897-6T(b).
248See supra note 31 and accompanying text.
240See supra note 191 for a description of these rules; cf Robert F. Hudson, Jr., An Analysis of
Temporary FlRPTA Regs. Under § 897(d) and (e) (Partll), 4 TAX MOMT. REAL EsTATE J. (BNA) 243
(Oct. 5, 1988). Under section 897(d) and (e) (Part II) (pointing out that there is a theoretical matrix
of 15 types of transactions that could qualify for nonrecognition under the rules and commenting that
it is unfortunate that the regulations provide only two examples given the rather complicated matrix
of requirements). Along with the administrative costs associated with this and the other special
nonrecognition rules are costs in terms of being at odds with other policy objectives. The nonrecognition rules may be justified by the policy of according current tax-free treatment to transactions that
lack non-tax significance. See generally Daniel N. Shaviro, An Efficiency Analysis of Realization
and Recognition Under the Federal Income Tax, 48 TAX L. REV. I (1992). Thus, to the extent that
the FIRPTA rules modify or override nonrecognition treatment for transactions that otherwise receive such treatment, the policy objectives underlying nonrecognition are sacrificed in order to
advance other objectives. This is not to suggest it is never worth surrendering the policy objectives
underlying nonrecognition. It is simply to say that there is a policy cost to modifying and overriding
nonrecognititon rules that should also be considered in a costlbenefits analysis of the USRPHC rules.
250See supra note 241 for an additional reason for repealing the special corporate nonrecognition
rules that use the USRPHC concept.
'mCf Feingold and Glicklich, supra note 5 at 263-64 (pointing out that if the USRPHC rules were
repealed, many of the concerns underlying the FIRPTA special nonrecognition rules would disappear; concluding that with the GU Repeal, it is possible to substantially simplify FIRPTA by
repealing the USRPHC rules and modifying the regular corporate nonrecognition rules only to the
extent of ensuring that the transferee's basis in a USRPI does not exceed the transferor's basis plus
the amount of gain recognized by the transferor under the particular nonrecognition rule). Even with
the repeal of the USRPHC rules and abandonment of the immediate tax policy, the foreign-toforeign exchange rules may continue to serve a useful purpose by taxing transfers of USRPIs to tax
haven corporations that are incorporated in countries lacking exchange of information agreements
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A provlSlon that is derivative of the USRPHC rules and special corporate
nonrecognition rules is section 897(i). This section permits a foreign corporation
to elect to be treated as a U.S. corporation for purposes of FIRPT A where the
corporation is entitled to nondiscriminatory treatment under a treaty, holds a
USRPI, and would qualify as a USRPHC upon making the election. 252 Congress's
purpose for allowing this election was to blunt claims that FIRPT A discriminates against foreign corporations because of the different treatment accorded
U.S. corporations under the statute. 253 While GU Repeal has generally leveled
the tax playing field for foreign and U.S. corporations with respect to distributions, some differences remain for distributions as well as exchanges as a result
of the special corporate nonrecognition provisions. 254 Consequently, if the
with the United States (see supra note 191 for the requirements set forth in Regulation section 1.8976T(b)(2». The apparent concern with such transfers is that it would be more difficult for the United
States to enforce the tax on a disposition of the USRPI by the transferee foreign corporation.
Nevertheless, a foreign person could defeat this purpose by initially holding the USRPI in a tax
haven corporation. Therefore, for foreign persons acquiring USRPIs after the publication of Treasury
Regulation section 1.897-6T (which occurred on May 5, 1988), the rules may present merely a trap
for the unwary.
Another rule that appears to fall within this category is the special treatment of REITs under the
USRPHC rules. While domestically-controlled REITs are excepted from the USRPHC rules, other
REITs (that is, "foreign-controlled" REITs) are not. See LR.C. § 897(h)(2). Arguably, if the USRPHC
rules were eliminated, the foreign-controlled REIT rule should go as well, along with the rule's
additional administrative costs (that is, the effort that goes into determining what constitutes a
domestically-controlled REIT, as provided in section 897(h)(4)(B». Cf Staffaroni, Foreign Investors in RICs and REITs, 56 TAX LAW. 511, 563 (2003) (pointing out the difficulty of determining
whether a widely-held REIT is domestically controlled, as well as the lack of direct authority on the
meaning of indirect foreign ownership in the context of the domestically-controlled determination).
While this is probably sensible, it should be pointed out that there might be stronger equity and
efficiency bases for retaining the immediate tax policy in the REIT situation because shares in
REITS are disposed of more frequently than typical USRPHC interests. The equity and efficiency
bases for retaining these rules are weakened somewhat by the treatment accorded domesticallycontrolled REITS, but this treatment may be due to the fact that in the domestically-controlled
context, tax planning for foreign persons is not likely to dominate the REIT's disposition and
distribution policies. See supra note 119. On the other hand, as with non-REIT USRPHCs, a foreign
person can hold REIT shares through a foreign corporation and may be able to dispose of the shares
by selling stock in the foreign corporation, thus avoiding an immediate U.S. tax on the disposition.
Cj supra Staffaroni, at 551 (noting that where REIT shares are held through Australian listed
property trusts that are treated as foreign corporations under the check-the-box rules, sales of the
trust units are not taxable to the unit holders under FlRPTA). Moreover, with the exceptions in the
USRPHC rules for publicly-traded corporations along with domestically-controlled REITs, many
foreign investors are not taxable under FIRPTA on their dispositions of shares in REITS (see supra
Staffaroni, at 568), thus further suggesting that the equity and efficiency costs of repealing the
foreign-controlled REIT rule may be minimal. And of course, the administrative downside with
retaining the foreign controlled REIT rule is that the USRPHC machinery would have to be kept
alive for this purpose.
2
25 See LR.C. § 897(i); Reg. § 1.897-3(b), -8T(b).
253See Rubin and Hudson, supra note 34 at A-55.
254For example, while a liquidating distribution of a USRPI by an 80% owned U.S. corporation to
its U.S. parent would be tax free under section 337, the same transaction by a foreign corporation
could be taxable under Regulation section 1.897-5T(c), as modified by Notice 1989-85, 1989-2 C.B.
403. As another example, a foreign person would receive nonrecognition treatment under section
351 and Regulation section 1.897-6T(a) on a transfer of a USRPI to a U.S. corporation in exchange
for stock, provided the corporation is a USRPHC immediately after the exchange; however, a
transfer of a USRPI to a foreign corporation generally would be taxable under Regulation section
1.897-6T(a), (b).
Tax Lawyer, Vol. 57, No.2

338

SECTION OF TAXATION

USRPHC and special corporate nonrecognition rules were to be eliminated, the
purpose for allowing the section 897(i) election should vanish and thus so should
the election. 255 The administrative costs of the Hi" election include significant
rule complexity256 as well as several tax planning opportunities.257

3. International Tax Concerns
As with the direct USRPI rule, a revised analysis of the benefits and costs of
the USRPHC rules should consider international tax concerns, that is, the United
States' obligations under income tax treaties and the limitations that arise out of
the desire to harmonize the income tax laws of different countries. While Congress presumably has determined already that the equity and efficiency benefits

Because of these differences under current law, the "i" election can be advantageous in certain
circumstances; however, the benefits of the election have waned over the years. Prior to the Tax
Reform Act of 1986, the election allowed foreign investors to obtain preferential capital gains
taxation (at the individualleveI) on the disposition of U.S. realty held through a foreign corporation,
by taking advantage of old section 337 to insulate the gain from taxation at the corporate level. See
Hudson, supra note 145 at 3043. GU Repeal, however, removes this major benefit of the election.
See id. Moreover, while the election can reduce gain recognition under the regulations in reorganizations involving foreign corporations holding USRPIs, Notice 1989-85 (which modifies Regulation
section 1.897-5T(c» achieves the same result in most situations. See id. On the other hand, the
election is still beneficial where a foreign person transfers a USRPI to a foreign corporation, because
without the election the transfer likely would be taxable under Regulation section 1.897-6T. See
Rubin and Hudson, supra note 34 at A-59. The election may also be useful to avoid the ten percent
withholding tax under section 1445 where a foreign corporation disposes of a USRPI (see Hudson,
supra note 145 at 3043; Rubin and Hudson, supra note 34 at A-60); nevertheless, the reduction in
U.S. tax is not likely to be significant because there would still be liability for the substantive
FIRPTA tax. See Hudson, supra note 145 at 3043.
255'fwo other commentators also recognize that it would be possible to eliminate the "i" election
with the repeal of the USRPHC rules, but concluded otherwise because of the limitations imposed
under Treasury Regulation section 1.897-6T(a) on the ability of a foreign corporation to use sections
1031 and sections 1033. See Feingold and Glicklich, supra note 5 at 264 n.18. This regulation
provides that the nonrecognition provisions apply on a foreign person's transfer of a USRPI only to
the extent that the transferor receives a USRPI in the exchange. After 1989, section 1031 is no
longer applicable to an exchange of a USRPI for foreign real property by either a U.S. or foreign
exchanger. See LR.C. § 1031 (h)(I). Therefore, Regulation section 1.897-6T(a)'s limitations are no
longer relevant to the application of section 1031. However, it is possible to receive nonrecognition'
treatment under section 1033 on an involuntary conversion where the relinquished property is a
USRPI and the replacement property is foreign real estate. See' LR.C. § 1033(a)(2), (g); H. CONF.
REp. No. 101-386, at 614 (1989) (non-like-kind treatment of U.S. and foreign real property does not
apply for purposes of section 1033(g». Consequently, Regulation section 1.897-6T(a) continues (and
should continue, even with the repeal of the USRPHC rules) to limit a foreign corporation's ability
to use section 1033, and thus to this extent there would continue to be differences in the tax
treatment of foreign and U.S. corporations under FIRPTA, even with the elimination of the USRPHC
and special corporate nonrecognition rules. Nevertheless, it does not appear to be worth the administrative effort to retain the "i" election solely for the involuntary conversion situation.
256See Reg. § 1.897-3, as modified by Notice 1989-85, 1989-2 C.B. 403.
257For example, Regulation section 1.897-6T(a)(7), examples 7 through 10, provide four identical
factual situations with different tax results depending on whether the foreign corporations involved
have made "i" elections. It should be noted that to some extent these different tax results under the
regulations are eliminated with the modifications made by Notice 1989-85 with respect to reorganizations and "i" elections.
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of FIRPT A outweigh the negative consequences of overriding existing treaty
obligations 258 and deviating from international tax norms, the reduced benefits of
the USRPHC rules suggest that a reconsideration of this issue is in order.
As mentioned previously, the United States entered into 12 of its 55 current
income tax treaties prior to the adoption of FIRPTA. 259 Seven of these treaties
contain provisions that conflict with, and are overridden by,260 the USRPHC
rules. 261 Consequently, to a limited extent the USRPHC rules may continue to
produce treaty override costs in terms of diplomatic capital and potential repercussions. 262 On the other hand, since the adoption of FIRPTA, the United States
has entered into 43 treaties that permit the application of the USRPHC rules. 263

supra note 82.
supra note 80 and accompanying text.
260As noted earlier, FIRPTA prevails over conflicting treaty obligations as of January I, 1985. See
supra note 81 and accompanying text.
261See Income Tax Convention, July 9, 1970, U.S.-Belg., art. 13, 23 U.S.T. 2687; Income Tax
Convention, Feb. 12, 1979, U.S.-Hung., art. 12,30 U.S.T. 6357; Income Tax Convention, May 7,
1975, U.S.-Ice., art. 16,26 U.S.T. 2004; Income Tax Convention, Mar. 8, 1971, U.S.-Japan, art. 16,
23 U.S.T. 967; Income Tax Convention, June 4,1976, U.S.-Korea, art. 16,30 U.S.T. 5253; Income
Tax Convention, Oct. 8, 1974, U.S.-Pol., art. 14,28 U.S.T. 891; Income Tax Convention, Dec. 4,
1973, U.S.-Rom., art. 13,27 U.S.T. 165.
262e! Kaplan, supra note 42 at 1113 (noting these as the costs of treaty override in the context of
FIRPTA); see Lee, supra note 206 (pointing out the damage to international relations and the risk of
a retaliatory response as the costs of treaty override in the context of a proposed tax on the gain
realized on stock dispositions by foreign persons owning at least ten percent of the stock in a U.S.
corporation).
263See Income Tax Convention, May 14, 1953, U.S.-Austl., art. 13,4 U.S.T. 2264; Income Tax
Convention, May 31, 1996, U.S.-Aus., art. 13, T.I.A.S. No. 10570; Income Tax Convention, Dec.
31, 1984, U.S.-Barb., art. 13,22 U.S.T. 164; Income Tax Convention, July II, 1986, U.S.-Berm.,
TAX TREATIES (CCH) '![ 1403.02 (no article dealing with capital gains); Income Tax Convention, Sept.
26, 1980, U.S.-Can., art. 13, T.I.A.S. No. 11087; Income Tax Convention, Apr. 30, 1984, U.S.P.R.C., art. 12, T.I.A.S. No. 12065; Income Tax Convention, Mar. 19, 1984, U.S.-Cyprus, art. 16,35
U.S.T. 4737; Income Tax Convention, Sept. 16, 1993, U.S.-Czech Rep., art. 13, TAX TREATIES
(CCH) '![ 2403.03; Income Tax Convention, Aug. 19, 1999, U.S.-Den., art. 13, TAX TREATIES (CCH)
'![ 2500.02; Income Tax Convention, Jan. 25, 1998, U.S.-Est., art. 13; Income Tax Convention, Aug.
24,1980, U.S.-Egypt, art. 7, 33 U.S.T. 1809; Income Tax Convention, Sept. 21,1989, U.S.-Fin., art.
13, T.I.A.S. No. 12101; Income Tax Convention, Aug. 31, 1994, U.S.-Fr., art. 13, TAX TREATIES
(CCH) '![ 3001.04; Income Tax Convention, Aug. 29, 1989, U.S.-F.R.O., art. 13; Income Tax Convention, Sept. 12, 1989, U.S.-India, art. 13, TAX TREATIES (CCH) 'lI 4203.05; Income Tax Convention, July II, 1988, U.S.-Indon., art. 14, T.I.A.S. No. 11593; Income Tax Convention, July 28, 1997,
U.S.-Ir., art. 13; Income Tax Convention, Nov. 20, 1975, U.S.-Isr., art. 7; Protocol with Respect to
Income Tax Convention, Apr. 17, 1984, U.S.-Italy, art. I, '![ I I, T.I.A.S. No. 11064; Income Tax
Convention, May 21, 1980, U.S.-Jam., art. 13,33 U.S.T. 2865; Income Tax Convention, Oct. 24,
1993, U.S.-Kaz., art. 13, TAX TREATIES (CCH) 'lI 5303.02; Income Tax Convention, Jan. 15, 1998,
U.S.-Lat., art. 13; Income Tax Convention, Jan. 15, 1998, U.S.-Lith., art. 13; Income Tax Convention, Apr. 3, 1996, U.S.-Lux., art. 14, TAX TREATIES (CCH) '![ 5701.05; Income Tax Convention, Sept.
18, 1992, U.S.-Mex., art. 13, T.I.A.S. No. 12404; Income Tax Convention, Aug. I, 1977, U.S.Morocco, art. 13,33 U.S.T. 2545; Income Tax Convention, Oct. 13, 1993, U.S.-Neth., art. 14, TAX
TREATIES (CCH) '![ 6103.04; Income Tax Convention, July 23, 1982, U.S.-N.Z., art. 13, 35 U.S.T.
1949; Income Tax Convention, Oct. I, 1976, U.S.-Phil., (Senate reservation to art. 14),34 U.S.T.
1277; Income Tax Convention, Sept. 6, 1994, U.S.-Port., art. 14, TAX TREATIES (CCH) '![ 7803.04;
Protocol with Respect to Income Tax Convention, June 17, 1992, U.S.-Russ. Fed'n, 'lI 6, TAX
TREATIES (CCH) '![ 6103.04; Income Tax Convention, Oct. 8, 1993, U.S.-Slovk. Rep., art. 13, TAX
TREATIES (CCH) 'lI 8103.06; Income Tax Convention, June 21, 1999, U.S.-Slovn., art. 13; Income
2S8 See

259See
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Repealing the USRPHC rules may therefore provide these foreign signatories
with a benefit for which they had not bargained. The fact that the USRPHC rules
apply infrequently264 minimizes any concern with regard to overriding conflicting treaty obligations. However, it may be determined that repealing the USRPHC
rules would result in a considerable increase in the number of U.S. real estate
dispositions via stock sales,265 and thus, a significant lowering of the tax burden
for foreign investors in U.S: realty; if that is the case, the unexpected benefit
provided to 43 foreign signatories may be an additional factor in favor of retaining the USRPHC rules. 266
Unlike the direct USRPI rule,267 the USRPHC rules appear to be at odds with
the tax laws of at least several other countries. 268 Consequently, this raises the
possibility that the rules may lead to international double taxation, because other
countries may not be providing either credit or exemption relief where the United
States taxes their residents on dispositions of USRPHC stock. However, with
their limited application, the USRPHC rules should not pose a significant risk of
double taxation.
4. Evaluation'

The revised policy analysis suggests that serious consideration should be given
to the elimination of the USRPHC rules. With GU Repeal, the rules have the
potential for producing equity and efficiency benefits by generally imposing an
immediate U.S. tax upon an ownership change in U.S. real property held in U.S.
corporate solution. Nevertheless, these equity and efficiency benefits may be

Tax Convention, Feb. 17,1997, U.S.-S. Afr., art. 13; Protocol with Respect to Income Tax Convention, Feb. 22, 1990, U.S.-Spain, 'll1O(a), 1591 U.N.T.S. 41; Income Tax Convention, Sept. I, 1994,
U.S.-Swed., art. 13; Income Tax Convention, Oct. 2, 1996, U.S.-Switz., art. 13; Income Tax Convention, Nov. 26, 1996, U.S.-Thail., art. 13; Income Tax Convention, June 17, 1985, U.S.-Tunis.,
art.13; Income Tax Convention, March 28, 1996, U.S.-Turk., art. 13; Income Tax Convention, Mar.
4, 1994, U.S.-Ukr., art. 13; Income Tax Convention, July 24, 2001, U.S.-U.K., art. 13; Income Tax
Convention, Jan. 25,1999, U.S.-Venez., art. 13, TAX TREATIES (CCH) 'llII,103.06. In addition, the
treaty with Norway has been amended to permit taxation under the USRPHC rules. Protocol with
Respect to Income Tax Treaty, Sept. 19, 1980, U.S.-Nor., art. 6, 23 U.S.T. 2832.
64
' See supra notes 140-141 and accompanying text; Blum, supra note 5 at 674 (noting that the tax
on USRPHC stock rarely applies).
'6'Part III.B.l.d recommends that the federal government conduct a study to gauge the increase in
U.S. real estate dispositions via stock sales that would result from repealing the USRPHC rules.
266S uch a finding would also indicate that retaining the USRPHC rules increases the tax liability of
foreign persons that hold U.S. real estate; this in turn suggests that even though the USRPHC rules
apply infrequently, the indirect tax liability resulting from the rules may continue to raise concerns
of treaty override with respect to some U.S. treaty partners. To a limited degree, this may offset any
concerns about providing foreign signatories with an unexpected benefit by repealing the USRPHC
rules.
2·'See supra notes 85-86 and accompanying text.
268In this regard, the American Law Institute reported in 1992 that many countries do not impose
tax on gains realized by nonresidents from dispositions of capi tal assets, except for assets connected
with a business conducted in the particular country or real estate located therein. On the other hand,
the ALI also noted that some countries treat real property holding companies as transparent, thus
taxing gain on the disposition of their shares. See American Law Institute, Federal Income Tax
Project, International Aspects of United States Income Taxation II: Proposals of the American Law
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insignificant in light of the following factors: the limited extent to which foreign
persons would avail themselves of sales of stock in U.S. real estate holding
corporations if the USRPHC rules were repealed, the possible ability of foreign
persons to avoid the USRPHC rules by selling stock in foreign corporations
holding USRPIs, and the offsetting competitive benefits to U.S. persons that
may result from repealing the rules. In this regard, this Article recommends that
the federal government undertake a study that seeks to gauge the increase in the
number of U.S. real estate dispositions via stock sales that would result from
repealing the USRPHC rules. Furthermore, with the avoidable nature of the
section 897 tax on stock sales and the potential double tax that occurs where the
tax applies, it does not appear that equity is advanced even with respect to those
foreign persons that are taxed on the disposition of stock in a USRPHC. Significantly, the USRPHC rules appear to create considerable administrative burdens
for taxpayers and the government due to the complexity of the rules themselves
as well as that of ancillary provisions. On the other hand, international tax
concerns may not be an important factor in the analysis because of the limited
tax liability effects of the rules. On balance, the equity and efficiency benefits of
the USRPHC rules may not warrant the significant administrative costs involved.269
IV. CONCLUSION
The interrelated and fluid nature of U.S. tax law requires policymakers and
scholars to monitor the law for provisions that no longer serve legitimate policies, but merely clutter and complicate a system bordering on unworkable. Recent efforts in this regard by the Staff of the Joint Committee on Taxation have
been fruitful (yet unrealized for the most part), and this Article applies this type
of analysis to provisions under FIRPTA.
An examination of the direct USRPI rule indicates that while the provision is
somewhat superfluous as a result of subsequent changes in the tax law, it continues to advance the equity and efficiency underpinnings of FIRPT A by ensuring
that foreign persons are subject to U.S. tax on dispositions of investment interests in U.S. real property. Moreover, the direct USRPI rule serves to simplify the
tax law by substantially obviating the need to determine whether a foreign
person's U.S. real estate acti~ities constitute a U.S. trade or business for pur-

Institute on United States Income Tax Treaties 201-203 (1992). Finland imposes such a tax, and
Canada generally taxes gains on the disposition of stock in privately-held Canadian corporations
whether or not the corporations hold Canadian real estate. See Robert Couzin and Mark Novak,
Business Operations in Canada, 955-3d TAX MGMT. PORTFOUO (BNA) A-30 to A-31 (2003); Risto
Rytohonka, Business Operations in Finland, 960-2d TAX MGMT. PORTFOUO (BNA) A-58 (2003).
269Cj Blum, supra note 5 at 675 (concluding that the USRPHC rules should be repealed because
the direct administrative burdens of administering the rules seem disproportionate to the amount of
loophole closing achieved); Fred Feingold and Peter A. Glicklich, An Analysis of the Temporary
Regulations Under FlRPTA: Pan II, 69 J. TAX'N 348, 354 (1988) (concluding that instead of
drafting the special FIRPTA nonrecognition rules, it would have been more useful to devote this
energy to conforming FlRPTA to the realities of the world post-GU Repeal; if that had been done,
FlRPTA could have been dramatically simplified by eliminating the USRPHC rules).
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poses of applying the effectively connected income tax regime. Consequently,
the direct USRPI rule should .be retained. In addition, the law should be further
simplified and improved by eliminating the net basis election for U.S. real
property and instead treating all income from US. real property, whether from
operations or dispositions, as effectively connected to a U.S. trade or business.
On the other hand, sound policy objectives may no longer support the USRPHC
rules. With GU Repeal, the role of the USRPHC rules has been reduced to
ensuring that a foreign person's disposition of stock in a USRPHC is subject to
an immediate U.S. tax, rather than what is effectively a' discounted tax, thus
possibly advancing equity and efficiency to this extent. Whether Congress intended for this secondary·role when it enacted FIRPTA is unclear. In any event,
the equity and efficiency benefits of the USRPHC rules may be insignificant,
especially given the general reluctance of buyers to engage in stock acquisitions
of U.S. realty and the possible ability of foreign persons to avoid the current
USRPHC rules by disposing of stock in a foreign corporation. Because these
benefits may be outweighed by the significant administrative costs of the USRPHC
rules, this Article recommends that serious consideration be given to the elimination of the USRPHC rules. 270

27DIn order to evaluate the equity and efficiency costs of repealing the USRPHC rules, this Article
recommends that the federal government undertake a study that seeks to gauge the increase in the
number dispositions of U.S. real estate via stock s~les that would result from repealing the rules.
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